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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence on how ownership structure and 
owner’s identity affect performance, in the specific case of the banking industry by using a panel of 
Indonesia banks over the period 2000–2009. The work is divided into two main parts. In the first 
one, we analysed the impact of the presence of multiple blockholders on bank ownership structure 
and performance. Building on multiple agency and principal-principal theories, we investigated 
whether the presence and shares dispersion across blockholders with different identities (i.e. central 
and regional government; families; foreign banks and financial institutions) affected bank 
performance, in terms of profitability and efficiency. We found that the number of blockholders has 
a negative effect on banks’ performance, while blockholders’ concentration has a positive effect. 
Moreover, we observed that the dispersion of ownership across different types of blockholders has a 
negative effect on banks’ performance. We interpret such results as evidence that, when 
heterogeneous blockholders are present, the disadvantage from conflicts of interests between 
blockholders seems to outweigh the advantage of the increase in additional monitoring by 
additional blockholder. 
In the second study, we conducted a joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic 
effects of different types of ownership on banks’ performance. We found that regional banks, 
foreign banks and branch banks have a higher profitability and efficiency as compared to domestic 
private banks. In the short-run, foreign acquisitions and domestic M&As reduce the level of 
overhead costs, while in the long-run they increase the Net Interest Margin. Further, we analysed 
interest margin determinants, to asses the impact of ownership on bank business orientation. Our 
findings lend support to our prediction that the impact of interest margin determinants differs 
accordingly to the type of bank ownership. We also observed that banks that experienced changes in 
ownership, such as foreign-acquired banks, manifest different interest margin determinants with 
respect to domestic or foreign banks that did not experience ownership rearrangements.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Objectives of the dissertation 
The connection between ownership and firm’s performance has been widely studied since Berle and 
Means’ work in 1932. They identified the separation between ownership as a central characteristic 
of the modern corporations’ control and emphasized in the potential of divergence between owners’ 
and managers’ objectives. The work by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 formalized this separation 
issue and introduced principal-agent theory.  They defined an agency relationship as a contract in 
which one or more persons (the principal) involved another person (agent) to perform some services 
and functions on behalf and delegating of duties and authority to the agent. Moreover, they argued 
that ownership can play significant role in determining the agency cost level. Previous literature has 
analysed, for instance, the impact of ownership structure on performance (e.g. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Lemmon & Lins, 2003), the influence of performances on ownership 
structure (e.g. Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001), and the impact of major 
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shareholders’ identities on performance (e.g. Pedersen & Thomsen, 2000; Pedersen & Thomsen, 
2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Cucculelli, 2009).  
However, there are at least two reasons why studies on ownership are still important and 
worthwhile to conduct. Firstly, a rapid and diversified change has been characterizing ownership 
structures of firms around the world (Leaven & Levin, 2008). These changes have leaded to the 
creation of so-called “multiple blockholders” (MB) or “multiple large shareholders” arrangement, in 
which firm is jointly controlled by several blockholders. A significant number of such ownership 
arrangement can be found in Asian countries (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001), European countries 
(Leaven & Levin, 2008) and even in the U.S, where firms are traditionally believed to be in large 
part diffusely-owned (Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, & Metrick, 2006; Holderness, 2009). 
Although some previous works have tried to deal with the issue of MB, most of them have only 
focused on the distribution of shares (Attig, Ghoul & Guedhami, 2009; Konijn, Kräussl, & Lucas, 
2011; Leaven & Levin, 2008; Maury & Pajuste, 2005).  Studies on the concomitant presence of 
different types of ownership in one single firm and on the ways in which these peculiar structures of 
ownership impact on performance are still very limited (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & Wright, 
2010). 
Secondly, even though most of previous research has revealed that owner’s identity affects 
performance (Pedersen & Thomsen, 2000; Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; 
Cucculelli, 2009), little is still known about what actually happens in firms that experience 
ownership changes. Performance changes due to ownership changes are not only a matter of agency 
problems, as often claimed. It is important to consider that factors that determine changes in 
performance might be due to ownership rearrangements that ultimately translate into modifications 
of a bank’s strategy. The mechanisms by which different types of owners may follow different 
kinds of goals besides profitability and thus pursue different strategies or portfolios are still largely 
left unexplored. Previous studies on the topic of ownership revealed that usually different types of 
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ownership have different objectives. As a consequence, they are likely to influence the strategic 
behaviour of their invested firms in different ways (Colpan, Yoshikawa, Hikino, & Del Brio, 2011; 
David, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2010; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006).   
This dissertation aims to address such gaps by considering the presence of several 
blockholders, the identities of blockholders and the difference of business orientation among types 
of owners when analysing the relationship between ownership structure and performance. The core 
of the dissertation is constituted by two empirical papers addressing the above mentioned issues in 
the context of the Indonesian banking industry. Our first empirical study investigates the 
relationship between the presence of MB and firm performance by taking into consideration the role 
of ownership identity. In order to complement previous research (Attig et al., 2009; Konijn et al., 
2011; Leaven & Levin, 2008; Maury & Pajuste, 2005), we examined the impact of the presence of 
MB and ownership dispersion of different types of blockholders on performance using a sample of 
120 Indonesian banks over the period 2000-2009. In line with the predictions of multiple agency 
and principal-principal theories, we argue that the presence of multiple blockholders, with diverse 
and possibly conflicting interests, might lead to negative consequences in terms of performance. We 
are using a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model with year dummies and our model is 
calculated using the fully robust variance-matrix estimator, which allows for within-cluster (firm) 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. In the robustness check section of the paper, we also present the 
estimates computed with other regression models, in order to deal with specific econometric issues, 
such as the endogeneity and the unobserved firm effects. 
Our second empirical study focuses on the impacts of different types of ownership on 
performances. We analyse the differences of performance, among different types of ownership: 
central government-controlled banks, regional government-controlled banks, domestic banks, joint 
venture-foreign banks and branch banks, by including variables that control for static, selection, and 
dynamic effects (Berger, Clarke, Cull, & Udell, 2005). We also analyse the impacts of ownership or 
    
   4 
 
governance changes, such as: privatization (through public listing and foreign acquisitions), foreign 
acquisition of domestic private banks and domestic merger and acquisitions (M&As) on banks’ 
performance. Further, in order to better understand the relationship between type of ownership and 
performance, we take into consideration differences in bank’s business orientation, described by 
banks’ characteristics such as risk aversion level, market approach (focus on retail consumers vs. 
wholesale consumers), and diversification among different types of ownership (Cerruti et al., 2007; 
Carbo-Valverde & Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2007; Williams, 2007). We analyse the ways in which 
different types of ownership might have different business orientation and how this orientation in 
turn, affects performance. Using the same research context with our first study, Indonesian banking 
industry, our data is constituted by a sample of 133 Indonesian banks over the period 2000-2009. 
We use the net interest margin, defined as the ratio of the spread between a bank’s interest earnings 
and expenses to total earning assets, in order to measure the price of the intermediation services 
provided by banks (Williams, 2007). While, NIM determinants (in this study we focus on a bank’s 
characteristics) refer to the factors that influence banks in setting the level of the NIM. We are using 
these NIM determinants as references for bank’s business orientation. In analysing the impact of 
ownership and governance changes, we are using a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model 
which calculated using the fully robust variance-matrix estimator, which allows for within-cluster 
(firm) correlation and heteroskedasticity. In second analysis on NIM determinants, we are using 
panel data analysis (fixed- and random-effect model). We use also some control variables and year 
dummies as the robustness check.  
The Indonesian banking industry constitutes our research context in both studies since it 
suitable with our research objectives. First of all, in the banking sector, it is particularly interesting 
to study those hybrid ownership structures that rose in the last two decades due to the dramatic 
changes in ownership arrangements occurred as a consequence of the joint forces of 
privatization/nationalization, restructuring and M&A waves, liberalization, as well as of other 
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environmental changes (Berger, et al., 2005). As a result, the banking industries worldwide (and 
particularly in emerging countries) have seen the emergence of a diverse set of ownership 
arrangements, in which multiple types of owners co-exist (The Economies, 2010). We can found 
such peculiar ownership configurations in Indonesia. Indeed, during the last twenty years, 
Indonesian banks have undergone remarkable changes of governance and their activities were 
marked by a number of events regarding bank governance adjustments such as public listing, 
foreign acquisitions and M&As. Thus, the current ownership structure of the Indonesia banking 
industry allows us to investigate various forms of banking ownership, starting from government-
controlled banks, domestic private banks mostly controlled by families, join-venture banks and 
branch banks. In general, the Indonesia banking industry provides a unique data-set, well-fitted with 
our research goals. 
Our first study contributes to the existing literature at least in three ways. First, we extended 
studies on multiple blockholders (e.g. Attig et al., 2009; Konijn et al., 2011; Leaven & Levin, 2008; 
Maury & Pajuste, 2005) by looking at the heterogeneity of blockholders. We are not only 
considering the way in which shares are distributed among blockholders, but also the ways in which 
they are distributed among different types of blockholders. We argue that the ways in which shares 
are distributed across large owners with different identities plays a significant role in determining 
the impact of governance arrangements on performance. We claim that focusing on the 
concentration/dispersion of shares, without considering the identities of blockholders, provides a 
partial perspective to the study of principal-agent or principal-principal problems. Second, we 
suggest that - given the increase of complexity and dynamism in ownership structures around the 
world, and in particular in emerging countries - traditional agency theory may not be sufficient to 
fully understand how internal governance systems affect firms’ strategies and results. The recourse 
to multiple agency and principal-principal perspectives (Arthurs & Johnson, 2008; Connelly, 
Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Young, Peng, 
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Bruton, & Jiang, 2008) can provide a deeper insight to explain what happens in multiple 
blockholders firms. Moreover, these two perspectives not only assume that owners and managers 
may have divergent goals, but they assume that also different types of owners might have 
conflicting objectives. Third, referring to ownership studies in banking; our study underscores the 
importance of considering the distribution of ownership or ownership composition among 
blockholders. While the topic of ownership has been widely investigated in banking studies (Berger 
et al., 2005; Bonin, Hasan, & Wachtel, 2005; Caprio, Laeven, & Levine, 2007; Shehzad, De Haan, 
& Scholtens, 2010), most of the works so far have only focused on dominant or major shareholders, 
without taking into account the issue of ownership composition and especially the joint presence of 
blockholders with multiple identities. The current ownership structure, in which many banks - 
especially in emerging countries - are owned by several blockholders, alone signals the importance  
of taking into consideration ownership distribution among blockholders when examining the 
relationship between ownership and performance. 
Our second study gives different contributions to the existing research, especially to the 
literature of banking studies. First, the knowledge of changes in bank’s business orientation shades 
some more light on what happens to banks that undertake ownership or governance changes. Many 
previous studies tend to view governance changes only as a transfer from one type of ownership to 
another, attributing differences in performance, prior- and post-ownership change, only to the 
managerial abilities associated with each type of ownership (e.g Williams & Nguyen, 2005). Our 
analysis provides strong support for the notion that changes in ownership might shift a bank’s 
business orientation and this, in turn, have an impact on a bank’s performance. On this basis, 
information about the ways in which banks conduct their business after governance or ownership 
changes is crucial to gain a better understanding of the impacts of ownership changes on 
performance. Second, it extends studies on NIM determinants (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000; 
Carbo-Valverde & Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2007; Williams, 2007) by analysing how NIM 
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determinants differ depending on banks’ ownership-types and in the presence of governance 
changes. The concept that determinants of banks’ interest margins might differ by banks’ 
ownership-type has not been properly explored in the literature so far. We suggest that the sources 
of interest-income and expenditures differ by banks’ ownership. Thus, different banks’ owners have 
different incentives, and consequently different strategies, when setting margins. Third, our study 
provides a broader picture on the impacts of different types of banks ownership on performance. 
Only a few studies (Berger et. al., 2005, Bonin et al, 2005, Williams & Nguyen, 2005) document 
the more nuanced, holistic view of state, foreign, and domestic ownership of banks. However, those 
studies did not fully consider some types of ownership which are common in emerging countries, 
such as regional banks and branch banks.  
The introduction presented a preview of the findings of our two studies and offered an 
overall explanation on the novelty and contribution of our work. More detailed explanations on the 
summary of our results, positioning of the present research within the reference literature, factors 
that motivate its novelty and intended contributions of our work will be provided at the introduction 
part of each study. 
 
1.2 Structure of the dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 consists in a literature review 
of ownership studies in the banking sector. In this chapter we will briefly review some of the 
research findings on the relationship between ownership and performances that are connected with 
our study. In particular, we will focus on the studies about the role of ownership’s structure and 
identity on bank’s performances. In the last part of this section we discuss about some gaps that are 
still left explored in the study of bank’s ownership. Chapter 3 describes the Indonesian banking 
industry as a research context. We will illustrate the developments in the Indonesian banking 
industry before and after the Asian crisis in 1997-1998. We will describe the regulation and 
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institutional developments which took place in that period. We will pay special attention to the issue 
of banks’ ownership in Indonesia, since this issue is directly related with our objectives of the study. 
Moreover, we also have observed significant evolutions on this side, especially related with 
changing in the types or identities of banks’ major owners.  
We explain each of our empirical studies in Chapter 4 and 5. Chapter 4 describes our first 
empirical study about hybrid ownership and performance. Chapter 5 describes second empirical 
study about ownership, business orientation and performance. Each chapter is constituted by several 
sections, respectively:  the introductory part which explains the main objectives of the study, the 
summary of the findings and the contribution of the study; the literature review part which discusses 
previous works are related with our topic, a description of the positioning of our study with respect 
to the existing literature and an explanation on the ways in which we have developed our 
hypothesis; the data and methodology section with an illustration of the data and variables that we 
used and the methodology followed to analyse the data; a results section which discusses the results 
of our analysis, including a comparison between of our results with the ones underscored by 
previous literatures; a conclusive section which outlines the summary of research objectives and 
summarizes the findings revealed.  
Finally, Chapter 6 draws the conclusions of both of our empirical studies, on the basis of the 
results and findings presented in the two previous sections (chapter 4 and chapter 5). In this chapter 
also discuss the limitations of our studies and provide some ideas for future research.  The last part 
of the chapter draws some policy implication that can be extracted from the results of the study. The 
policy implications are consists of policy in the managerial level and industry/macro level. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Theoretical background: ownership studies in banking 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though banks are a quite unique organizational context, the problem of bank governance does 
not differ greatly from the governance problem of any other organization (Andres & Vallelado, 
2008). As a matter of fact, the same core corporate-control mechanisms that influence the 
governance of non-financial firms also influence banks’ operations (Caprio et al., 2007). There is a 
wealth of researches on bank governance and performance. In order to contribute towards a better 
understanding of the causes underlying differences in performance, several studies in banking are 
have taken into consideration a set of different governance proxies such as ownership and/or change 
of it (e.g. Berger et. al, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005) merger and acquisitions (e.g., Vander Vennet, 
1996); ownership concentration and owner’s identity (e.g. Iannotta, Nocera, & Sironi, 2007); the 
composition of Board of Directors (BoD) and changes of it (e.g. Crespi, Garcia-Cestona, & Salas, 
2004).  
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Although a wide arrange of perspectives has been used to investigate corporate governance 
studies in the banking sector, the point of view of ownership has probably become the central one. 
Firstly this is due to the fact that ownership transfers have become the major force of governance 
changes that characterized the last two decades and shaking the banking industry around the world 
(Berger et al., 2005). Secondly, widely studied governance changes in the banking sector have 
mostly concerned transition or developing countries, where laws of investors’ protection are still 
underdeveloped. In such institutional contexts ownership has become the main corporate 
governance form to deal with the agency problem that existed in firms (Young et al., 2008). In this 
chapter, we will briefly review some of the research findings on the performance effects of 
corporate governance in banking, with a special attention on the role of ownership structure and 
identity. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we will discuss about the relationship 
of ownership structure and performance. We will also present previous literature on ownership 
structure and performance that has been done in banking area.  The next section of this chapter will 
focus on literatures about ownership identities and performances in banking studies. We will 
discuss three main ownership identities that were widely studied in banking: government 
ownership, foreign ownership and domestic private ownership. The last section of this chapter will 
present a critical review on ownership studies in banking. Additionally, we will outline some issues 
that need to be explored since the available literatures still provide unclear answers.  
 
2.1 Ownership structure and bank performance  
2.1.1 Ownership Concentration and Performance 
Studies on ownership emerge with the seminal work of Berle and Means (1927) that identified the 
separation between ownership as a central characteristic of the modern corporation’s control. Berle 
& Means (1927) emphasize the potential of divergence between owners’ and managers’ objectives 
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arguing that this separation will create opportunity for managers to expropriate corporate resources 
for their own benefits. The work by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 formalized this issue and 
introduced “principal-agent theory” or “shareholder model”  based on the premise that managers, as 
agents of shareholders (principal), can engage in decision making and behaviours that may be 
inconsistent with the maximization of shareholder wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined an 
agency relationship as a contract in which one or more persons (the principal) involved another 
person (agent) to perform some services and functions on his/her behalf, delegating duties and 
authority to the agent. They used the empirical models drawn from theory of agency and finance to 
develop a theory of ownership structure of the firm.  
In general, agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989). The first is the agency problem that arises when the goals of the 
principal and agent are in conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is actually doing. Second, there is a problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and 
agent have different attitudes toward risks. Ownership arrangements can be means to address such 
problems, since the way in which ownership is distributed among shareholders could determine the 
ability of shareholders to control firm’s management and make sure that the management conducts 
its activities in order to achieve the maximum of shareholders wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
addition, the size of shares influences the incentive of shareholders to conduct a monitoring 
function (Shleifer & Vinshy, 1997).  
In the corporate finance and management literatures, ownership arrangements become one 
of the central issues underscored in examining the relation between ownership and performance. 
Scholars have tried to discern, for instance, whether ownership concentration has an impact on 
performance. More specifically, the key question addressed is what kind of ownership - 
concentrated or dispersed - brings a better impact on firm performance or value. The results of 
ownership studies are still conflicting and different theoretical perspectives have emerged. On the 
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one hand, the concentration ownership is viewed to bring a positive impact on performance. 
According to the incentive-based view (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), shareholders with a large cash 
flow ownership have an incentive to closely monitor a firm’s performances, in order to potentially 
mitigate the principal-agent problems that might arise between managers and shareholders. This 
view argues that the increase in concentration has a positive impact on performances since the 
increase in concentration means that owners have more motivation and ability to control managers. 
In line with this view, several studies have found a positive correlation between a firm’s value and 
cash-flow ownership of large shareholders (Pedersen & Thomsen, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, 
and Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002b). On the contrary, the 
entrenchment-based view, formalized by Stulz (1988), maintains that the increase in ownership 
concentration could produce a negative impact on a firm’s value and performance. Large 
blockholders may pursue their own interests at the expenses of other minority shareholders (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986; 1997). Consistently with this argument, scholars have proposed that a firm’s value 
falls (decreases) when control rights exceed cash flow rights of large shareholders (Claessens, et al. 
2002; Morck, Stangeland, & Yeung, 2000).  
Unlike early studies on ownership that used United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) 
as research contexts, where most of the firms are characterized by a widely held ownership type, 
other studies in different countries found different results. Study by La Porta and others (1999) 
showed that ownership in public firms outside the US and UK is concentrated in the hands of very 
few major shareholders, typically members of wealthy families. Moreover, Claessens, Djankov, and 
Lang (2000) found that more than two-thirds of East Asian firms are controlled by a single 
shareholder. Those major owners tended to use controlling devices, such as top-down chain of 
control pyramids and multiple class shares, to secure control rights. Since major owners appeared to 
be able to control management, this type of ownership raised a new problem and in particular it was 
found that control power enabled controlling shareholders to gain private benefits at the expenses of 
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minority shareholders (Volpin 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003). In addition, East Asian firms also 
showed a sharp divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights - that is, the largest 
shareholder was often able to control a firm's operations with a relatively small direct stake in its 
cash-flow rights. Claessens et al. (2002), using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations from 
eight East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), found that relative firm’s value - as measured by the market-to-
book ratio of assets -increases with the share of cash-flow rights in the hands of the largest 
shareholder. This result is consistent with previous studies on the positive incentive effects 
associated with increased cash-flow rights in the hands of one or a few shareholders. However, they 
found that the entrenchment effect of control rights has a negative effect on firm value. 
One of the factors is considered to have an important role in deciding the impact of 
ownership structure is the legal protection of shareholders. The legal protection of shareholders is 
the backbone of any corporate governance system since it will determine the ability and the 
incentives of shareholders in monitoring the firms. For instance, minority blockholder owners can 
exercise their rights only in countries with a developed legal system, whereas majority ownership is 
a more viable option in countries with a weak legal system (La Porta et al., 1999). As a result, 
differences in legal protection of shareholders explain a substantial part of the differences in the 
ownership structures across countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Nevertheless, La porta et al, 
(1999) used the data on ownership structures of large companies in the 27 richest economies to 
investigate the fundamental controlling shareholders of these firms. An empirical analysis of the 
sample revealed that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, few of these firms 
were widely held.  
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2.1.2 Ownership Concentration in Banking Studies 
Contradictions in the results gained in the study of ownership concentration raised a number of 
critical questions regarding the relation between different forms of ownership and performance 
encouraging many scholars to apply the same research question in specific contexts, for instance in 
the banking industry. Using an approach similar to the one adopted for ownership studies in 
corporate finance, some empirical studies in the banking area tried to provide evidences on the way 
in which ownership concentration had an influence on banks’ value and performances. There are at 
least two most common ways used to capture the ownership concentration variable in banking 
studies. The first one is to consider the number of shares that are owned by majority or largest 
shareholders (e.g Caprio et al., 2007; Laeven and Levin, 2009). The second way is to use a dummy 
variable that represents banks with concentrated ownership (e.g. Boujelbene and Zibri, 2009; 
Shehzad, De Haan, and Scholtens, 2010). A bank is said to exhibit a concentrated ownership if there 
is at least one large shareholder within the bank’s ownership structure. A large shareholder is 
usually defined as an owner who has a significant amount of shares (using 10%, 20% or 50% 
threshold).   
Studies about the impact of ownership concentration on performance, in banking have also 
provided contradictive results, just as the ones collected in corporate finance studies. On one side, 
some researches revealed the positive impact of ownership concentration on bank’s performance 
(e.g. Caprio et al., 2007; Iannotta et al., 2007; Kwan, 2004; Shehzad, et al., 2010). Kwan (2004), 
using US banking data, found  that publicly traded banks tend to be less profitable and incur higher 
operating costs than privately held similar bank holding companies. Caprio et al. (2007), using data 
of 244 banks from 44 countries, found that cash-flow rights by the controlling owners have a 
positive impact on a bank’s valuations. Shehzad et al. (2010), using data of 500 banks from 50 
countries, found that banks with concentrated ownership have a lower non-performing loans ratio. 
As for Europe, Iannotta et al. (2007) used a sample of large banks from 15 European countries and 
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they evaluated the impact of alternative ownership forms (government, mutual, private), together 
with the degree of ownership concentration, on performance and risk. The authors observed that 
higher levels of ownership concentration increased loans’ quality and lowered the risks.  
However, other ownership concentration studies conducted in the field provided a very 
different picture (e.g. Saunders, Strock, & Travlos, 1990; Demsetz, Saidenberg, & Strahan, 1997; 
Laeven and Levin, 2009; Boujelbene and Zibri, 2009). Saunders et al. (1990), using US banking 
context, found that stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behavior 
than managerially controlled banks during the 1979-1982 period. However, Demsetz et al. (1997), 
using the US banking context also, found that the relationship between ownership structure and risk 
is significant only at low franchise value banks. The more recent work by Laeven and Levin in 
2009, using data regarding 279 banks from 48 countries, found that cash-flow rights of the largest 
shareholders have a negative relationship with a bank’s bankruptcy risk. Moreover, Boujelbene and 
Zibri (2009) found that ownership concentration increases banks’ risk-taking behaviours.  
One important aspect to be acknowledged when trying to understand potential mechanisms 
behind bank corporate governance is  bank is different from non-bank firm,  in terms of regulations 
and degree of opacity (especially due to moral hazard and asymmetric information), and its making 
empirical evidence based on non-bank samples not directly applicable in banking settings (Laeven 
& Levine, 2009). Banks’ balance sheets are also opaque for investors because the quality of loans 
and investment portfolios are difficult to assess. This makes owners’ ability and incentives become 
more crucial rather than in non-bank firms. Furthermore, previous researches have shown that the 
ability and incentives for shareholders to monitor banks depends on how effectively their rights are 
protected (Levine, 2004; Adams and Mehran, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This perhaps 
explains why banks with dispersed (unconcentrated) ownership structures are more prevalent in 
countries with stronger shareholders’ protection laws. Some studies of corporate governance in 
banking have examined how risk and performance are affected by investor protections’ laws, 
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banking regulations and the extent of ownership concentration. With these regards, two recent 
cross-country studies brought two notable contributions. Caprio et al. (2007) noted that banks 
typically do not have dispersed ownership, but instead, they are often controlled by large 
shareholders in terms of families, foundations or the State. Concentrated ownership structures 
appear to increase valuation, while weak shareholder protections’ laws reduce banks’ values. 
Building on Caprio’s insights, Laeven and Levine (2009) found that risks are higher for banks that 
have large owners with substantial cash flow rights. However, this effect is weaker in countries with 
strong shareholders’ protection laws. The authors argue that large cash flow rights are crucial in 
reducing the adverse effects on bank valuations associated with weak shareholder protection laws. 
 
2.2 Owners’ identity and bank performance 
Another stream of ownership researches in banking analyses the relation between type of ownership 
and performance. These works explore whether different types of ownership lead to different 
performance levels or whether changes in ownership types have an impact on banks’ performance. 
Within this framework, there are three types of ownership that have traditionally received central 
attention: government or state ownership, foreign ownership and the domestic large shareholder or 
family ownership.  
 
2.2.1 Government Ownership 
Government ownership in the banking sector has been consistently declining since 1970 and this 
pattern continued over the last ten years as a consequence of the many shifts in the economic 
system (e.g. east European countries). However, government ownership of banks still exists in the 
banking sector in several countries characterized by poor economics conditions, more 
interventionist and less efficient governments, less secure property rights (Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine, 1999; La Porta, et al., 2002a). In fact, in several countries the government ownership in 
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banking industry has increased, since the impact of financial crises lead to the nationalization of 
some banks. For instance, this is what happened in several Asian countries during the 1997-1998 
financial crises (e.g. Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines). The nationalization of 
banks as a consequence of a crisis has also happened in developed countries, when the role of 
government was relatively limited. For example, this is what happened in the US (e.g. JP Morgan, 
Bradford & Bingley and Citibank) and UK (e.g. Northern Rock, RBS, Lloyds and HBOS) when the 
financial crisis erupted in 2008-2009. Although some banks were re-privatized, however this 
process takes some time, and thus we can still find a significant presence of government banks.  
One of main arguments supports the presence of government ownership in the banking 
sector was proposed in 1962 by Gerschenkron. He argued that governments can play a major role in 
the financial and economic development of countries in which economic institutions are not 
sufficiently developed for private banks to play this role. However, several studies grounded in 
developing countries found that the presence of State-owned banks in the banking sector has an 
unfavourable impact on the banking sector and on the economy as a whole. Indeed, the domination 
of state-owned banks could determine a set of troublesome consequences such as: reduced access to 
credit, contracted financial system development and slow economic growth (e.g., La Porta et al., 
2002a; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2004; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004; Galindo and 
Micco, 2004). Using data of ten of the largest banks in 92 countries, La Porta et al. (2002a) showed 
that in 1970 a higher level of government ownership of banks was associated with slower 
subsequent financial development and lower economic growth. Barth et al. (2004) examined the 
relationship between state ownership and development measures in the banking sector. Using 
banks’ data from 107 countries, they found that government ownership of banks is negatively 
related to favourable banking outcomes, and positively related to corruption.  
Regarding the performance of government-controlled banks, studies found that government-
controlled banks have inferior performance if compared to other banks characterized by different 
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types of ownership (Vining and Boardman, 1992; Berger et al., 2005; Dinç, 2005; Micco, Panizza, 
and Yañez, 2007; Sapienza, 2004). Micco et al. (2007) examined the relationship between bank 
ownership and bank performance in 119 countries. They found that, in developing countries, state-
owned banks had lower profitability, higher costs, higher employment ratios, and poorer assets’ 
quality than their domestic counterparts.  
The literature on ownership in the banking industry revealed at least three main reasons why 
government-controlled banks perform poorly if compared to other types of bank. Firstly, State-
owned banks are burdened by many objectives related with economic and social development. 
Hence, the objective of profit maximization is often neglected because sometimes government-
controlled banks have to sacrifice their profit orientation in order to fulfil their roles of agents of 
economic development (La Porta et al., 2002a). Secondly, government-controlled banks are 
vulnerable to political intervention. Some of the bank’s asset portfolios may be allocated to obtain 
certain political objectives (e.g. obtaining votes, bribing office holders) and, the pursuit of such 
objectives, inevitably hampers bank’s efficiency (Sapienza, 2004). Micco et al. (2007) found that 
the performance differences between public and private banks gets wider during election years. This 
result also supports the hypothesis that political concerns are the real hidden drivers of these results. 
According to Sapienza (2004), lending behaviour of State-owned banks in Italy is affected by 
electoral results of the party affiliated with the bank. In addition, Dinç (2005) shows that 
government-owned banks in emerging markets significantly increase their lending in election years 
relatively to private banks. The bulk of the evidences also showed how political intervention brings 
a negative impact on bank’s performances (Micco et al., 2007; Sapienza, 2004; Dinç, 2005). Third, 
the appointment process of management and other staff usually gives preference to people with 
political influence rather than to people who actually have the ability to perform. The lack of 
incentives from the government to monitor managerial behaviour is leading to ample levels of 
managerial discretion. Moreover, the assessment of related lending practices by banks is low since 
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these banks generally operate with government subsidies (La Porta, et al., 2002a). 
 The relatively poor performances of government-controlled banks and the liberalization 
process have increased the privatization activities in several emerging countries (Megginson, 2005). 
As privatization processes began to spread widely, the number of researches concerned with 
privatization and performance started to rise1. This stream of research mainly investigates the 
effects of the privatization on bank performance using individual countries or cross-countries as a 
research context. Countries that have been investigated concerning the privatization process of 
banks include: Argentina (Berger et al., 2005), Brazil (Beck, Crivelli, Summerhill, 2005a; Nakane 
and Weintraub, 2005), Mexico (Haber, 2005), and Nigeria (Beck, Cull, Jerome, 2005b). Studies of 
privatization using cross-country data have mainly examined privatization processes  in transition 
countries (e.g. Bonin et al., 2005 using Eastern Europe countries) or countries hit by an economic 
crisis (e.g. Williams and Nguyen, 2005 using East Asia countries). These studies generally highlight 
that at least one indicator of bank performance improved following privatization, although some 
measures showed no change. Some researches found signs of greater prudence in lending after 
privatization as shown in the decrease of non-performing loans (e.g. Beck et al., 2005b; Haber, 
2005).  
 One interesting question regarding privatization processes is to whom the ownership of 
privatized banks is transferred to. For instance, it seems that foreign investors’ participation is more 
likely to bring a positive impact on bank performance rather than private domestic participation. 
Boubakri, Cosset, & Fischer (2005) highlight the importance of privatizing banks by selling them to 
strategic foreign investors. They found that newly privatized banks controlled by local industrial 
groups became more exposed to credit-risk and interest-rate risk after privatization. On the contrary, 
privatized banks controlled by foreign investors proved to be more efficient in terms of overhead 
costs. In many of the transition nations, control of many of the privatized banks shifted from state 
                                                          
1
 The impact of bank privatizations on bank performance has been well documented in the literature, as summarized in 
various papers (Clarke, Cull, and Shirley, 2005; Megginson, 2005) 
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ownership to foreign ownership. The entry of foreign banks after privatization generally played a 
positive role by making domestic banks more efficient in terms of overhead costs and spreads, 
although not always it carried out a significant effects on the profitability levels (Berger et al., 2005; 
Boubakri et al. , 2005; Micco et al., 2007).  
 
2.2.2 Foreign Ownership 
The second type of ownership that has received a great deal of attention in the banking literature is 
foreign ownership. The bulk of the studies documented an impact of foreign banks’ presence on the 
banking industry performance, especially in emerging countries. From several previous studies we 
can summarize the impacts of foreign banks’ entry in emerging markets. On one side, foreign 
ownership could give several benefits such as (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001; 
Micco, Panizza, & Yañez, 2004; Unite and Sullivan, 2003): 1) Increase soundness, because usually 
the foreign parent banks belong to well regulated financial systems. 2) Increase the level of 
competition in the banking sector that could lead to higher efficiency. 3) Provide greater access to 
capital and liquidity that bolsters the strength of banks’ balance sheets and the average amount of 
loans 4) Transfer to local banks the skills and technology that enhance risk management 5) Fortify 
emerging market financial systems by encouraging higher standards in auditing, accounting and 
disclosure, credit risk underwriting, and supervision. 6) The allocation of credits to the private 
sector may be improved since it is expected that the evaluation and pricing of credit risks will be 
more sophisticated. 7) It is expected that foreign banks will provide more stable sources of credit 
since they may refer to their parents for additional funding and they have easier access to 
international markets. Thus, domestic financial markets will be less vulnerable to domestic shocks. 
8) Foreign banks may reduce the costs associated with recapitalizing and restructuring banks in the 
post-crisis period.  
On the other side, there are also some studies that reveal the costs of foreign banks’ entry, 
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such as (Barajas, Salazar, and Steiner, 2000; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000): 1) If the 
franchise value of domestic banks decreases with foreign banks’ entry, they may have an incentive 
to take on greater risks. 2) Access to credit may be impaired for some sectors of the economy. 3) 
Foreign banks may increase financial instability by pulling out of host countries or by contagion 
from problems in the home country. 4) Since foreign banks have different priorities and business 
focuses, their lending patterns tend to ignore domestic priorities. Moreover, it is still not clear if the 
presence of foreign banks has a positive or negative impact on the possibility to access credit for the 
private sector. For example, Clarke, Cull, and Martínez-Peria (2001) showed that foreign banks’ 
penetration improves access to credits. While Detragiache et al. (2006) reported the opposite result, 
that the presence of foreign banks reduces the access to credits for the private sector.  
Another stream of study related with foreign ownership, is more focused on the comparison 
of performance between foreign banks and other types of banks (e.g. government or private 
domestic banks). In terms of performance of foreign banks compared to other types of banks, some 
studies conducted on this issue showed contradictive results which seem to be highly related with 
the specific context that is used in each of the studies. For instance, the work by Claessens et al. 
(2001) empirically documents that foreign banks are more profitable than their domestic 
counterparts in developing countries, but the opposite is true in developed markets. In much of the 
same vein, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) study banks in 80 countries over the 1988-1995 
periods and find that foreign banks have higher margins and profits than domestic banks in 
developing countries, but the opposite is true in industrial countries. Some other works also 
revealed the pattern by which foreign banks  perform better in developing countries (e.g., Clarke et 
al., 2000; Dages et al., 2000; Bonin et al., 2005) and, on the contrary, they register an inferior 
performance in developed countries (e.g. DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Berger et al., 2000). 
 The main argument which tries to explain the situation just described is related with the 
several advantages and disadvantages that foreign banks have while operating abroad. Some 
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research suggests that the advantages of foreign ownership may outweigh the disadvantages in 
developing nations. In developing countries, foreign banks are more likely to pursue profit 
maximizing opportunities than government or private domestic controlled banks, which may have 
supplementary goals different than value-maximization, such as social motives or conglomeration 
motives (Claessens, et al., 2001; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Micco, et al., 2004). 
Foreign-owned banks are usually part of large banking organizations, and thus they generally face 
the same scale economies and diseconomies of large, domestically-owned institutions. They may 
also have advantages in serving multinational customers, better access to capital markets, superior 
ability to diversify risks, and the capacity to offer some services to multinational clients not easily 
provided by domestically-owned banks (e.g., Goldberg and Saunders, 1981). In developing nations, 
foreign-owned institutions from developed nations may also have access to superior technologies, 
particularly information technologies for collecting and assessing ‘‘hard’’ quantitative information. 
Although foreign-owned banks may also have some disadvantages due to problems related to 
managing from a distance, coping with multiple economic or regulatory environments, and 
accessing qualitative information about local conditions, however the bulk of the literature tends to 
converge on the conclusion that the advantages manage to outweigh the disadvantages, especially in 
developing countries (e.g., Berger et al., 2003; Buch, 2003). 
Turning to the effects of foreign acquisitions on bank performance (dynamics effects), there 
is still very little clarity about the results. First, it is still not clear if the positive impact in post-
performance results are a direct impact of foreign acquisition, since it could be that foreign banks 
tends to acquire banks with good performances or domestic banks with performance problems, so 
that the effect of these acquisitions is modestly positive, but still not enough to raise the acquired 
banks’ performance up to the levels of their domestic peers (Peek et al., 1999). Moreover, there are 
still conflicting results on whether the variations in a bank’s performance after foreign acquisition 
are mainly due to an improvement in management or just to a shifting of a bank’s objectives. For 
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instance, Majnoni, Shankar, and Varhegyi (2003) document the dynamics of foreign banks’ 
ownership in Hungary between 1994 and 2000 and find that foreign banks, while pursuing similar 
lending policies, achieve greater profitability than their domestic counterparts. On the other hand, 
Berger et al. (2005) found that foreign acquisitions shift the banks’ portfolio to more profitable 
loans and pushes banks to abandon  low profitable loans (such as, Small Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) loan). 
 
2.2.3 Private Domestic Banks 
Another type of bank ownership is the private domestic-owned bank. While studies of family firms 
have been widely discussed in management and corporate finance literatures (e.g. Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), the literature on bank ownership focuses 
primarily on either state or foreign ownership of banks and does not pay too much attention on this 
type of ownership. There are some researches that include the analysis of private domestic banks, in 
order to document the more nuanced and holistic view of the relationship between type of 
ownership and bank’s performances (e.g. Berger et al., 2005; Mian, 2006; Micco et al., 2004). 
However, those studies usually use domestic banks as a comparison for government banks or 
foreign banks. 
In emerging countries, private domestic-owned banks are usually controlled by a large 
domestic shareholder in the form of family, wealthy individuals or closed firm that is fully owned 
by a family. The family-owned bank is usually created in order to support an affiliated business by 
providing funds for the group necessities, creating an internal market within the firm which is often 
used to circumvent restrictions, most notably the ones on offshore financing. This type of bank 
often directs a significant portion of its lending activities to related parties (e.g. firms controlled by 
the owners’ relatives), even when these firms are inefficient. This behaviour is observed primarily 
in developing countries with poor governance (La Porta, et al., 2003; Laeven, 2001). For example, 
    
   24 
 
La Porta et al. (2003) found that the amount of connected lending of a private bank in Mexico, in 
1995, accounts for about 20% of the total credit. 
 
2.3 Critical Review of Previous Studies 
Figure 1 provides a picture about the existing literatures of ownership studies in banking. It 
summarizes what we have been discussing in this chapter. It shows two main issues that widely 
discussed in banking: ownership structure and owner’s identity. In addition to these issues there is 
also a stream of research about ownership changes and performances. From the present review, it 
emerges that there are at least two topics of research that need to be further developed. Firstly, the 
literature on banks’ ownership structures and performance has mainly focused on majority owners, 
without examining in more details the issue of ownership distribution in each bank (e.g. Caprio et 
al., 2007; Laeven and Levin, 2009). While the literatures in corporate finance and management has 
already carried out many efforts to focus on the distribution of ownership among several owners 
who hold significant among of shares or blockholder (e.g. Attig et al., 2009; Leaven and Levin, 
2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005), little attention has been devoted to the distribution of ownership 
among blockholders in banking studies.  
Previous studies of multiple blockholder (MB) that consider distribution of ownership 
among blockholders usually focus on how many blockholders are included in the ownership 
structure and on  the distributions of ownership among those blockholders. Despite many efforts 
have been made to study MB and the impact on firms’ performance and value, what we currently 
know on this issue is still limited and the findings largely inconclusive. Some studies have 
supported the thesis that the presence of MB has a positive impact on firms (e.g Maury and Pajuste, 
2005; Attig et al., 2009).  On the other side, other studies have predicted that MB has no impact on 
performance, actually they can even decrease the ultimate performance (e.g. Singh and Davidson 
III, 2003; Konijn et al., 2011).  
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The consideration of the presence of multiple blockholders is very relevant for banking 
studies, firstly because in the last decade we have witnessed dramatic changes in banks’ ownership. 
Due to the institutional and economic conditions of a country, the process of ownership 
transformation usually takes a considerable amount of time (Jones and Mygind, 2003). As a 
consequence, we might find the presence of multiple blockholders in the banking sector. In our 
view, in light of the recent developments in the literature (Attig et al., 2009; Leaven and Levin, 
2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005), neglecting the presence of multiple blockholders could provide an 
incomplete figure of what happens in a bank’s governance.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis intends to fill this gap by examining the issue of ownership 
distribution in each bank. Not only we take into consideration the presence of multiple blockholder 
and the ownership distribution among them, but also the role of ownership identity that was 
neglected by previous researches on multiple blockholders (e.g. Attig et al., 2009; Konijn et al., 
2011; Leaven and Levin, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). Specifically, we intend to examine the 
impact of the presence and dispersion of different types of blockholders on performance in the 
banking industry. 
Secondly, despite the abundance of studies on the topic of banks’ ownership, there is still 
little knowledge about what happens to a bank that undergoes governance changes. Many of the 
previous works (e.g. William and Nguyen, 2005) tend to simplify governance rearrangements and 
conceive them only as a transfer from one type of ownership to another. Differences between 
performance prior- and post- ownership change are only associated with differences in the 
managerial abilities of each type of ownership. However, changes in ownership might also shift a 
bank’s business orientation that ultimately has an impact on banks’ performance. For example, 
changes in banks’ performance after privatization might be due to a shift of the bank’s business 
orientation. Several studies have documented how different types of ownership affect a bank’s 
business orientation which reflects, for instance, in the composition of its portfolio (Berger et al., 
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2005). Information about the ways in which banks conduct their business after ownership 
rearrangements is important to understand in what manners different types of ownership impact on 
performance.  
Chapter 5 of this thesis intends to address such issue by looking at the differences in 
business orientations of different ownership types and how these differences affect performance. 
Different types of owners may follow different kinds of goals besides profitability and thus have a 
different business orientation. We extended the study of ownership changes on bank’s performance 
by taking into consideration differences of business orientations among different types of ownership 
and by using Net interest Margin (NIM) determinants as a bank’s business orientation proxy. We 
analysed how different types of ownership shape business orientation and how this new orientation, 
in turn, affects performance. 
In addition of those two limitations above, it is also still important to explore other types of 
ownership that might not be widely found around the world, for example regional banks. Regional 
banks can only be found in specific countries, for example in Japan or Indonesia. Regional banks 
usually refer to banks that operate in certain area or region. In Japan, Loukoianova (2008) finds that 
regional banks are less cost and revenue efficient than both their private sector counterparts (City 
and Trust banks). Differently from what happens in Japan, regional banks in Indonesia not only 
cover certain areas or regions, but they are also controlled by local or province government. The 
study of different types of banks will increase our richness in knowledge about the topic of 
ownership identity, especially in the banking sector, since different types of ownership exhibit 
different behaviours. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Research context: the Indonesian Banking Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia’s banking crisis in 1997, which proved to be one of the most serious in any country in the 
world in the twentieth century (Enoch et al. 2001), has drawn much research interest. However, 
empirical studies analysing the Indonesian banking industry after the crisis are still very few. We 
developed this section in order to give more information about the Indonesian banking Industry that 
constitutes our research context. We will illustrate the developments in the Indonesian banking 
industry before and after the Asian crisis in 1997-1998. We will describe the transformations that 
characterized the Indonesian banking industry during and after this period, including the regulation 
and institutional developments which took place in those years. We will give special attention on 
the issue of banks’ ownership and especially on the ways in which different types of banks’ 
ownership are currently evolving, since we have observed significant evolutions on this side and 
since these changes are directly related with our researches questions.  
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes the developments 
of the Indonesian banking industry before the Asian crises in 1997-1998, including the period of 
government banks’ supremacy (1968-1980) in the banking sector and the liberalization process that 
occurred one decade prior to the crises. The second section describes the Indonesian banking sector 
during the crisis period, including an illustration of the restructuring processes that were taken by 
the government and of the regulation reforms that were implemented after the crises. Finally, the 
third section analyses ownership settings in the Indonesian banking sector after the crises. We focus 
on the presence of three types of ownership in the banking sector: government, private domestic or 
family and foreign. 
 
3.1 The banking institution before the 1997-1998 crises 
3.1.1 The beginning: State-owned Banks Supremacy 
The genesis of the Indonesian banking system is marked by the nationalization of several Dutch-
owned banks shortly after Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945. The State-planned 
economy in that era was closed to private funds, as the State exercised full control on this sector. As 
a consequence, the development of the banking sector was halted. In the mid of the 1960s a change 
in the government regime brought about a major shift in the Indonesian economic policy. The new 
government at the time was prone to implement a more open economic system. In the beginning of 
this period, the government of the time permitted new entries for private banks, including foreign 
banks. But then, permissions for the establishment of new banks were halted again in 1968, when 
the number of domestic private banks reached the number of 122, and the number of foreign banks 
accounted for 11 banks, ten  of which were branch banks and one a joint-venture bank (Sato, 2005).  
In this period, the Indonesian government intentionally maintained its ownership in the 
banking sector to support several development programs that were established. The government 
established priority sectors and actively provided financing to those sectors through government-
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controlled banks. By controlling banks, the government exercised a full control over interest rates 
and lending amounts that would be targeted to the priority sectors. In order to support the presence 
of these banks, the government gave some privileges to the State-owned bank in terms of interest 
subsidies and also of regulation that obligated state-owned enterprises to deposit all of their funds in 
the government-controlled banks.  
The government maintained numerous restrictions, such as interest rate ceilings and direct 
credit targets that left a limited space for private banks to set up their own interests and lending 
strategies in order to compete, especially with government-controlled banks. The restrictions 
imposed in the banking sector and the privileges recognized to government-controlled banks made 
bank’s competition relatively low at this period. In other words, government-controlled banks were 
left with absolute supremacy (Nasution, 1996).  
 
3.1.2 Liberalization period 
In 1981, the fall of oil prices disrupted economic growth of Indonesia, since oil was the major 
source of Indonesia’s revenues at the time. The decline of oil revenues made the government unable 
to maintain its role as a conduit for development funds through the banking sector, particularly 
through its directly owned banks. In order to increase capitalization of the banking sector, a series 
of reforms aimed at liberalizing bank were implemented. The first step of this liberalization process 
happened in 1983. Credit ceilings were removed and State-owned banks were allowed to offer 
market-determined interest rates on deposits.  Consequently, state banks raised both deposit and 
lending rates, and the balance of deposits at all commercial banks rose steeply. Still, restrictions on 
new entries were maintained. 
However the first liberalization measures appeared not sufficient to increase capital 
accumulation in the banking sector. In order to channel new fresh capitals from the private sector to 
the banking sector, further deregulation was introduced in October 1988 (policy package also 
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known as PAKTO 88). This second financial liberalization removed restrictions on new entries in 
the banking sector and eased the requirements for the opening of branches by all banks. Reserve 
requirements were reduced and the entry of new foreign banks through joint ventures was also 
permitted.  As a result of these liberalizations, many new private banks were established and this 
brought about an important revision of the principal players in the Indonesian banking sector. The 
shares of the seven state-banks in total commercial-banks’ assets declined from 63 percent in 1988 
to 38 percent in 1996, while the shares of private banks more than doubled from 24 to 52 percent 
(Sato, 2005). With the goal to increase competition in the banking sector, the government also 
started to reduce some privileges of government-controlled banks, for example the fact that state-
owned enterprises (SOE’s) were allowed to put their funds in private banks (Pangestu & Habir, 
2002). 
The liberalization made it much easier to establish new banks. The new ease of entry in the 
banking sector was surely seen as an opportunity for big economic groups looking to secure their 
sources of funds by establishing their own banks. One year before the financial crisis hit Indonesia 
in 1997, there were 42 affiliated banks that accounted for almost 38% of the shares of the banking 
sector. Some of these affiliated banks quickly carried out very aggressive policies aimed to increase 
their shares in the banking sector. However, this full liberalization had its own drawbacks. Banks 
were granted unsupervised freedom on lending decisions, fund-raising and bank establishment. The 
majority of credits of these new affiliated banks were channelled to firms within the same groups. 
As a consequence, these banks had their funds tied out with intra-groups funding (Sato, 2005).  
The Indonesian government and central bank soon realized that this situation could increase 
the structural vulnerability of the banking sector. Thus, the Government decided to raise the 
minimum capital required for the establishment of new banks, in order to slow down the number of 
new entries in the banking sector. In 1991, the central bank started to introduce prudential 
regulations designed to ensure the soundness of banks and to stabilize the consequences of the 
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liberalization. These directives included a requirement that all banks would have to meet a capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR), together with the introduction of new ratio-based standards of soundness and 
a point-rating system for all banks. In 1992, the new Banking Act (Act No. 7 of 1992) was enacted 
(Hendrobudiyanto, 1994). The Act provided some measures for the implementation of prudential 
regulations, such as administrative sanctions against noncompliant banks, criminal penalties for 
bank managers and employees, a “legal lending limit” restricting intra-group lending. Moreover, the 
Central Bank required all banks to issue quarterly financial statements, revamped the loan-loss 
reserve fund system, introduced an early warning system of bank failure and established the first 
domestic credit rating organization (Sato, 2005).   
 
3.1.3 Prior to the crisis 
Despite the efforts to improve systems of banking supervision, the banking sector had already 
shown some negatives symptoms at the beginning of 1990s. Risky behaviours started to spread as 
shown by an analysis of banks’ portfolios. One example of the way in which banks started to 
conduct risky behaviours is given by the fact that many banks began to give credit to industrial 
sectors such as real estate and construction. Those sectors are notably quite risky sectors since they 
are very connected with the growth of the economy; they are characterized by a longer payback 
return and they typically exhibit higher interest risks and credit risks. The real estate credit grew 
faster than the growth of total bank credits at that time and the increase in investments in the 
property sector outpaced the demand of property (Montgomery, 1997). Many properties were not 
sold to consumer and thus their prices were decreased.  As a consequence, a significant number of 
real estate loans could not be repaid and fell subject to default. In the end, the level of 
nonperforming loans was increased and even lead to insolvency (e.g. in 1992 Bank Summa was 
closed due to a financial failure stemming from intra-group real estate finance).  
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The excessive liberalization of entry also made it difficult for banks to maintain their 
financial soundness. Banks were confronted with increased costs resulting from intensified 
competition, but most of them responded to the competitive pressure by increasing the levels by 
which they were willing to accept risks (Enoch et al., 2001). Moreover, the lack of exit rules for 
banks increased banks’ moral hazard (Sato, 2005). Even after the banking sector shifted from state 
control to a market orientation, state banks of course, but private banks as well, tacitly assumed that 
the government would protect them, and believed that bank closures were unconceivable, especially 
for the banks that had close connections with the Government.  
In this period, the Central bank failed to manage effective policies of bank supervision and 
this decreased the effectiveness of the prudential regulations. The rampant dressing of financial 
statements by banks made it ever more difficult for the Central Bank to evaluate banks on the basis 
of accurate information (Sato, 2005). One of the factors that made this happen is the lack of central 
bank independence. Indeed, even if the Central Bank’s power was expanded under the Banking Act 
of 1992, institutionally it still remained under the control of the Government, enjoying very limited 
supervisory authority.  
While the central bank monitoring ability was limited, the lack of government involvement 
with regards to bank supervision exacerbated the weaknesses of industry’s monitoring. The level of 
political intervention in the banking sector was very high. Without the existence of specific 
oversight systems, all the abuses by the politically connected went unchecked. Based on political 
ties, loans were made to high-risk ventures. Some of these loans ended up in defaults and forced 
banks to violate their reserve-ratio requirements in order to continue their operations (Creed, 1999). 
Borrowers with political and bureaucratic connections swarmed to the state-owned banks, leading 
to a rise of huge loans to projects run by the well-connected business groups. Thus, the central 
bank’s prudential regulations eventually became paralyzed. The implementation of the restrictions 
on intra-group lending by group-affiliated banks was practically not obeyed.  
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3.2 The Asian Crisis 1997-1998 and Banking Restructuring 
As we can understand from the previous section, the Indonesian banking sector before the 1997-
1998 Asian crisis was very predisposed to a potential economic shock. Moreover, opening up the 
Indonesian banking sector to international investments made the banking sector vulnerable to 
currency shock and substantially more subject to default in the event of investor panic. As the Asian 
currency crisis spread to Indonesia in July 1997, the government officially enlisted the support of 
the IMF on October 31, in an effort to hamper a further deepening of the crisis. The banking crisis 
in Indonesia, which at first was limited to specific unsound banks, subsequently developed into an 
overall systemic crisis due to the financial unrest generated by the political instability and the 
accelerating currency decline generated after December 1997. 
  
3.2.1 Restructuring process 
The crisis forced the Indonesian Government, under the supervision of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), to launch a complete restructuring program in the banking sector in order to prevent the 
industry from collapsing. On November 1, it closed 16 private banks as a first measure of bank 
reconstruction. Ultimately, there were five rounds of bank closures and nationalizations between 
November 1997 and March 1999, while the recapitalization of reconstructed banks was carried out 
toward the end of 1999 (Enoch et al., 2001). The process of banking industry reconstruction was 
carried out on a scale which turned out to be far larger than initially expected and it took seven 
years to be completed.  
The five rounds of bank reconstruction measures resulted in the closure of 67 private banks 
(accounting for 16% of total commercial bank assets at the end of 1996), the nationalization of 12 
private banks (20%), and the recapitalization of all 7 state banks (36%), 7 private banks (8%), and 
12 (3%) of a total of 27 regional development banks (Sato, 2005). The number of nationalized and 
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recapitalized banks reached 38, together accounting for as much as 67% of the banking sector’s 
total assets. There was no state-owned or regional bank that was shut down, while their assets 
expanded as a result of the recapitalization. By contrast, 41% of private banks, accounting for a 
total of 31% of total private bank assets, were closed. Another 4% of private banks, accounting for 
46% of assets, were nationalized or recapitalized, and experienced ownership changes. Table 3.1 
shows the comparisons between the banking industry conditions in 1996 (before the crisis) and in 
1999 (after the restructuring process). As we can see from the table, the private banks are the type 
of banks that changed the most after the crises. About 50% of private banks (83 of 164 banks) were 
closed during the financial crisis. 
 
Table 3.1 
Indonesian Banking Industry in 1996 and 1999 
 
Classification 1996 Pre-crisis 
Reconstruction 
Measures 
1999 
Post-restructuring 
 Number 
of 
Banks 
Total 
Assets 
(Trillion 
Rupiahs) 
Asset 
Share 
(%) 
 Number 
of 
Banks 
Total 
Assets 
(Trillion 
Rupiahs) 
Asset 
Share 
(%) 
State banks 7 141 36.4  5 505 50.3 
Regional 
development banks 
27 11 2.8  26 25 2.5 
Private banks 164 201 51.7 Private banks total 81 350 34.9 
    Nationalization 4 205 20.4 
    Recapitalization 7 69 6.9 
    Without 
reconstruction 
70 76 7.6 
Joint venture banks 31 20 5.0  29 65 6.5 
Branch banks 10 16 4.2  10 58 5.8 
Total 239 389 100  151 1,004 100 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Banking Directory (various years); Sato, 2005 
 
 
3.2.2. Regulation reform 
The crisis has shown that the banking Industry in Indonesia was afflicted by a serious problem. The 
prudential regulations introduced before the crisis of 1997-1998 did not only contain loopholes, but 
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also lacked of a legal framework that could make those regulations effective. After the crisis, the 
financial institution and the bank supervision system had undergone major changes. In May 1999, 
the new Central Bank Act (Act No. 23 of 1999) was enacted. Bank Indonesia, the Central Bank, 
which was formerly placed under the executive branch of the government and given only limited 
authority, was legally guaranteed independence from the government and obtained broad authority 
over banks. It envisioned separating the bank’s supervision function from the Central Bank and 
establishing a new integrated supervisory framework for overall financial services. It was planned 
that the Central Bank role was maintained only for the sake of maintaining an independent currency 
and monetary policy, while the new Financial Service Authority (called “Otoritas Jasa Keuangan,” 
OJK) was established with the task of supervising and regulating four sectors: banks, security 
markets, insurance firms and pension funds. However, the establishment of the authority was 
eventually postponed and not yet realized until nowadays. Thus, the Indonesian Central Bank still 
plays the role of regulator body for the banking industry. 
Another policy that was introduced to increase the safety of the banking sector is the 
institutionalization of the deposit insurance system. The introduction of the payoff system was 
highly appraised among financial market experts, since it was expected to encourage depositors to 
choose good banks, and to make positive contributions to competition and to the soundness of the 
banking sector as a whole. However, the implementation of this system needed very careful 
assessments. The early introduction of a generous insurance system could create a situation of 
moral hazard for banks and increase the costs for the government, while the lack of a control system 
could spawn financial unrest. In the beginning, the government announced an insurance system for 
depositors involving insurance coverage for deposits of 20 million rupiahs or less, which covered 
93 percent of all depositors (Enoch, 2000). However, unprotected large depositors, who accounted 
for 80 percent of the total amount of deposits, made strong resistance to this measure. The fear that 
large depositors would draw back their deposits and lead to many bank runs pushed the Central 
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Bank to introduce a blanket guarantee system that gave insurances for all deposits at the end of 
January 1998. The government kept maintaining the blanket guarantee system to ensure 
stabilization and the deposit insurance was actually established only in 2008.  
The central bank pushed banks to be sounder and more prudent by imposing some 
regulations, for example the implementation of Basel Accord that required banks to maintain their 
levels of capital based on risk assessment. As a response to the new institutional environment, 
individual banks started to implement management reforms (Sato, 2005). One of the major reforms 
is the implementation of risk management. Before the crisis, even though many banks had 
organizations and procedures for credit management, they were generally little conscious of risk 
management. One of the management reform features was the establishment of in-house risk 
management systems. Banks started to increase their efforts, at their own expenses, to establish 
policies of information control for risk management and for the development of credit screening 
systems and capabilities. Moreover, banks started to implement organizational reforms to reduce 
misuses of bank resources, such as the appointment of independent commissioners and the 
establishment of an auditing committee. The bank enlisted a foreign bank’s assistance for the 
disposal of nonperforming loans and the design of the risk management systems, and sought a 
foreign consultancy’s advice in reforming the personnel system. 
Figure 3.1 provides a picture of Indonesian banking industry development during the period 
(1966 -2001) that we discussed above. In summary, Indonesian banking sector was began from 
government banking supremacy, then experienced some liberalization measures. The lack of 
regulations effectiveness has made the liberalization process lead to unsound banking industry that 
vulnerable to economic shock. It was proven when Asian crisis 1997-1998 erupted. 
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Figure 3.1 
Indonesian Banking Development 
(1966 – 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Banks Ownership after the Crisis 
The Indonesian banking sector experienced drastic adjustments after the Asian crisis in 1997 
(Enoch, 2000; Enoch et al., 2001; Sato, 2005). The changes occurred not only because the sector 
was severely hit by the economic crisis, but also because it was placed at the centre of the economic 
reforms carried out under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality. Following a series 
of banks’ reconstruction measures, there were major changes in the roster of owners of leading 
private banks. As the economic condition became more stable in 2000, the Government extended 
the scope of restructuring processes in the banking industry. Unlike the restructuring program 
launched during the economic crisis period (1997-1999), which was more focused to prevent the 
collapse of the banking sector, this extension was aimed to establish a banking sector that would be 
more prudent and healthier. The government started to launch a privatization program in 2001, in 
 
YEAR 
1988 
1997-1998 
2001 1966 
1983 
The government banks 
Supremacy period 
(1968 – 1983) 
Asian crisis happened 
that lead to the 
collapse of banking 
sector and economic 
crisis in Indonesia 
The government started to 
privatize the nationalized banks 
during restructuring period 
First round of banking 
liberalization: removal of some 
restrictions, such as interest rate 
ceilings and direct credit targets 
Second round of banking liberalization: 
removal of restrictions on new entries in 
the banking sector including for foreign 
bank through joint-venture and eased 
the requirements for the opening of 
branches by all banks credit targets. 
Restructuring period 
(1999-2000) 
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which some of the banks that had been nationalized were sold back to private investors, especially 
foreign investors. In addition, some of the state banks went public, even though the majority of 
shares were still held by the Government. This policy was expected to reduce the interventions of 
political parties and to make banks’ operations more transparent. The government started to reduce 
its involvement in the banking industry by selling some shares that were owned by cooperation or 
foundations that were affiliated with the government.  
As we noted before, private banks were the banks that changed the most because of the 
crisis. Table 3.2 provides the picture of changes that happened to private banks. Changes of 
ownership took place mainly within banks affiliated with business groups. Of 42 business-group-
affiliated banks, which accounted for 38% of all commercial banks’ assets prior to the crisis, only 7, 
with a combined ratio of 2% of total bank assets, survived without ownership changes. The 
surviving banks were mostly small banks operated by business groups as peripheral business. 
Among the banks not affiliated with business groups, there were more survivors than closures. 
Thus, the collapse of business-group-affiliated banks was the most notable change that occurred 
after the banks’ reconstruction process. Furthermore, in order to increase the strength of the bank 
industry by pursuing a general enlargement of banks’ sizes, the Indonesian central bank raised the 
capital requirements that banks needed to fulfil. These policies drew some domestic banks’ owners 
to look for partners in order to help them with the provision of fresh capitals. Moreover, the 
increase in competition in banking also push bank to have more capital to compete. As a 
consequence, numerous family-owned private banks, who had limited capital, began to carry out 
strategic actions such as selling shares to other banks and foreign investors, or going public.  
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Table 3.2 
Domestic Private Banks in 1996 and 1999 
 
1996 
Pre-crisis 
1999 
Post-restructuring 
Private Banks Number 
of 
Banks 
Asset 
Share 
(%) 
Private Banks Number 
of 
Banks 
Asset 
Share 
(%) 
Business-group-affiliated 42 36.7 Business-group-
affiliated 
  
Existing after the crisis 7 2.0 Existing after the crisis 7 2.2 
Nationalized 4 16.7    
Recapitalied  3 6.8 
Closed 23 9.9 
Formerly Business-
group-affiliated 
7 29.3 
M&As 5 2.2    
      
Independent 122 13.3 Independent   
Existing after the crisis 78 7.1 Existing after the crisis 67 6.7 
Close 44 6.1    
      
Total private banks 164 50.9 Total private banks 81 38.1 
Total of all commercial 
banks 
239 100 Total of all commercial 
banks 
152 100 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Banking Directory (various years); Sato, 2005 
 
 
The banking industry after the crisis was marked by an increase of foreign ownership’s 
presence.  At first, the government invited foreign investors to enter the Indonesian banking market 
by offering to the market, the nationalized banks during the restructuring period 1998-1999, as part 
of the privatization program. Since domestic investors were still hurt by the economic crisis, the 
government turned to foreign investors to buy privatized banks. The new foreign investors were 
expected to bring fresh capitals in the banking sector. Furthermore, the entrance of new foreign 
investors was seen as an opportunity for knowledge transfer and sharing in the industry and it was 
expected to increase the level of confidence in the banking sector. Further, the Government relaxed 
the ownership regulations regarding foreign ownership by allowing foreign investors to control up 
to 99% of the shares of a bank’s ownership. This policy has attracted many foreign banks and 
financial institutions to acquire the majority shares of some domestic private banks. 
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3.3.1 Recent Picture 
Before the economic crisis in 1997, the central bank grouped banks into five cluster base on bank’s 
ownership: central government banks, regional banks (owned by the province government), private 
domestic banks, foreign joint venture banks and foreign branch banks. This categorization was 
relevant before the 1997-1998 crises since it truly reflected the ownership condition of banks. After 
the crisis, central government still used that categorization and clustered banks in the same manner 
even if there were changes happening in the ownership of banks. For example, central bank still put 
some private banks in the category of “domestic private banks,” even though those banks were no 
longer owned by private-domestic investors. Since those private domestic banks were already taken 
over by foreign investors and were now controlled by foreigners. Another example we can offer 
concerns the cluster of “joint-venture banks”. This cluster comprises banks which were jointly 
owned by foreign and domestic shareholders. After the foreign ownership regulation was relaxed, 
many of previous “joint-venture banks” were now solely controlled by a foreign bank without a 
domestic partner holding any significant share. 
 Since there were significant changes in the ownership of banks, we suggest using different 
approaches to group banks. In this study we decided to group banks based on the identity of major 
owners or of the largest shareholders. Looking at the Indonesian banking industry in these days, we 
can divide banks into four groups, based on the different ownership identities that exist: central 
government banks, regional government banks, foreign banks, and Private domestic or family 
banks. The use of this categorization is supported by previous literatures (Faccio & Lang, 2000, La 
Porta, et al., 1999) and by the actual ownership conditions in Indonesian banking. We traced the 
ultimate owner of each bank, and then we analysed its identity to group it into the fit category. We 
believe that this approach is more suitable for the current ownership conditions in the Indonesian 
banking industry. 
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The presence of government ownership in the banking sector is still relatively high. The 
central government-controlled banks were still major players in the banking sector. The assets of 
the biggest four government controlled banks, account for 45% of total assets in the banking sector 
(See table 3.3). Although almost all the government-controlled banks were listed2, the government 
still owned the majority of shares (around 65% on average in 2009). Additionally, one has to 
consider regional banks. Differently from regional banks in other countries (e.g. in Japan), in 
Indonesia regional banks do not only refer to banks that have specific area of operation but that are 
also controlled by the province or regional government. They are accounted for 5% of total assets in 
the banking sector (Indonesian Central Bank, 2009). Even though their shares of assets compared to 
all banks assets is only 5%, regional banks are usually major player in the banking sector of their 
own provinces.  
Regarding foreign banks, there are at least three types of foreign banks in Indonesia. The 
first type is the branch bank. This a representative office or one-branch unit of a foreign bank that 
usually focuses on highly profitable specialised services for a limited group of clients. The second 
type is the joint-venture bank. In this second typology, the foreign bank establishes a new bank that 
is jointly owned with the domestic bank or domestic investors. The third type is the foreign 
acquisition bank. In the third type, foreign banks assume that they will be more efficient than local 
banks and thus able to export efficient banking practices at low costs. The mode of entry in the 
latter case is to buy a controlling share of an already established bank. Usually this process goes 
through the participation in a privatisation process, the buying of a controlling stake of publicly 
traded banks, or the acquisition of a licence from a small local bank converted into a 100% foreign-
owned daughter company of a global bank.  
Table 3.3 provides a list of ten of the largest banks. The list provides a clear picture about 
the changes that occurred. We can see that central government-controlled banks were dominating 
the list before and after the 1997-1998 crises. In 1996, six government banks that were included in 
                                                          
2
 Only one bank is still not listed until 2009 (Bank Tabungan Negara) 
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the ten largest banks, accounted for around 55%. In 2003, four government banks that were 
included in the ten largest banks, accounted for around 45%, or slightly decreased form central 
government-controlled banks’ shares before crises. We also can observe the increase in foreign 
banks’ participation. In 2003, six of the ten largest banks were foreign banks (five were former 
private domestic banks that were subsequently controlled by foreign institutions and one is a foreign 
branch bank). 
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Table 3.3 
Ten Largest Banks in 1996 and 2003 
 1996 2003 
Rank Name of Bank Ownership Asset %Asset Name of Bank Ownership Reconstruction Measures Asset %Asset 
1 BCA Private  
(domestic-owned) 
36.1 9.3 Mandiri State Recapitalization, merger 250.4 23.6 
2 BNI State 34.9 9.0 BNI State Recapitalization 125.6 11.9 
3 BRI State 34.4 8.9 BCA Private  
(foreign-owned) 
Nationalization, foreign 
sale 
117.3 11.1 
4 BDN State 32.4 8.4 BRI State Recapitalization 86.3 8.1 
5 Exim State 25.8 6.7 Danamon Private  
(foreign-owned) 
Nationalization, merger, 
foreign sale 
46.9 4.4 
6 BBD State 24.5 6.3 BII Private  
(foreign-owned) 
Nationalization, 
foreign sale 
36.3 3.4 
7 Danamon Private  
(domestic-owned) 
22.0 5.7 Permata Private  
(foreign-owned)  
Nationalization, merger, 
foreign sale 
28.0 2.6 
8 BII Private  
(domestic-owned) 
17.7 4.6 BTN State Recapitalization 27.1 2.6 
9 BDNI Private  
(domestic-owned) 
16.7 4.3 Citibank Foreign branch - 24.6 2.3 
10 Bapindo State 13.7 3.5 Lippo Private  
(foreign-owned) 
Nationalization, foreign 
sale 
24.2 2.3 
Total for 10 largest banks 258.2 66.6  766.7 72.3 
Total for all banks 387.5 100  1,059.8 100 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Banking Directory (various years); Sato, 2005. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Does hybrid ownership work?  
Blockholders diversity and performance in the banking industry  
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Initial studies on corporate governance arrangements have mainly focused on two opposite 
ownership structures: on the one hand, the widely-diffused ownership structures first studied 
by Berle and Means (1932); on the other hand, the structures centred on the presence of a 
single large shareholder, combined with many, small minority shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986). However, a rapid and diversified change has occurred in ownership structures 
around the world (Laeven and Levin, 2008). As a result, the corporate governance landscape 
has significantly changed in many countries, with the emergence of diverse and powerful 
owners. These changes have led to the creation of so-called “multiple blockholders” or 
“multiple large shareholders” arrangements, in which firms are jointly controlled by several 
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blockholders3. For instance, Faccio et al. (2001) revealed that about one-third of listed firms 
found in Asia Countries adopted this particular type of configuration, while Leaven and Levin 
(2008) found the same picture in Europe. We can even observe the increase of share 
ownership by blockholders in the U.S, a country in which firms are believed to be in large 
part diffusely-owned (Dlugosz et al., 2006; Holderness, 2009). Moreover, it has been noted 
that such governance arrangements often involve the joint presence of diverse types of owners 
- such as the State, families, industrial companies, financial institutions, investment funds, etc. 
- with important differences in objectives, investment horizons and abilities (Arthurs and 
Johnson, 2008; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003). We refer to “hybrid 
ownership” structures to identify such arrangements in which different types of large 
blockholders are jointly present. 
In order to better understand such varied and changing ownership landscape, a (still 
limited) number of empirical studies has been conducted on multiple blockholders (MB) 
(Attig et al., 2009; Leaven and Levin, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). Existing literature, 
however, still provides conflicting evidence on whether the presence of an additional 
blockholder will bring a positive or negative impact on a firm’s performance and value. A few 
studies have documented a positive correlation between the presence of multiple blockholders 
and firm value (Leaven and Levin, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). On the other hand, other 
studies have theorized or documented a neutral or negative impact on performance (Cronqvist 
and Fahlenbrach 2009; Singh and Davidson III, 2003). In our view, the conflicting results of 
this initial body of research can be partly explained by the lack of recognition of the 
heterogeneity in ownership types. Previous studies mainly focused on the number of 
blockholders and their share distribution in order to understand the impact of MB on 
                                                          
3
 In our paper, we refer to “blockholder” as an entity which holds a large share of stock in one firm. Following 
other papers (Faccio and Lang, 2002), empirically we use the 5% threshold to identify blockholders. A 
blockholder is thus a shareholder owning shares summing to 5% or more. See Sample and data section for more 
details. 
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controlling and monitoring processes and, by that, on performance (Attig et al. 2009; Laeven 
and Levine, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). There is therefore an underlying assumption that 
owners are relatively homogenous, and their incentives and ability to monitor are mainly 
influenced by their equity positions. Less attention has been devoted to investigating hybrid 
ownership structures and how the joint presence of blockholders with different identities (e.g. 
State, families, and foreign firms) impacts on firm’s performance. In this sense, novel 
theoretical perspectives such as multiple agency theory (Connelly et al., 2010) and principal-
principal theory (Young et al, 2008) can be useful to identify potential conflicts that may arise 
due to misalignment of interests between different blockholders.  
Based on such arguments, this chapter builds on multiple agency and principal-
principal theories in order to analyze the relationship between the presence of MB and firm 
performance while taking into consideration the role of ownership identity. In order to 
complement previous research (Attig et al., 2009; Konijn et al., 2011; Leaven and Levin, 
2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005), we examine the impact of the presence and dispersion of 
different types of blockholders on performance, by focusing on the banking industry in an 
emerging country – Indonesia - and on three types of blockholders which are dominant in 
emerging countries (Attig et al., 2009): the State; families; foreign firms. In line with the 
prediction of multiple agency and principal-principal theories, we argue that the presence of 
multiple blockholders with diverse, and possibly conflicting, interests can lead to negative 
consequences in terms of performance. 
The study of the banking sector is particularly interesting to study hybrid ownership 
structures since in the last two decades it has witnessed dramatic changes in ownership 
arrangements, as a consequence of the joint forces of privatization/nationalization, 
restructuring and M&A waves, liberalization, as well as other environmental changes (Berger 
et al, 2005). As a result, the banking industry worldwide (and in particular in emerging 
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countries) has seen the emergence of a diverse set of ownership arrangements, in which 
multiple types of owners co-exist (The Economies, 2010). The case of Indonesia, moreover, 
provides an ideal context to study our research question given that various types of ownership 
arrangements have emerged in the Indonesian banking industry over the last decade a 
consequence of financial crises, bailouts, privatizations and restructuring processes. 
Our empirical analyses are based on a sample of 120 banks observed over the period 
2000-2009. For each bank, we measure performance in terms of ROA and ratio of operating 
expenses to operating revenues (OEOR). The presence and nature of blockholders is captured 
through three indicators: the number of blockholders; the degree of ownership concentration; 
the distribution of shares across blockholders with different identities (government; families; 
foreign firm). The results of our regression analyses show that the increase in number of 
blockholders brings a negative impact on bank profitability and efficiency. We also find that 
ownership concentration has a positive relationship with banks’ profitability and efficiency. 
Moreover, we find that the distribution of ownership among different types of blockholders 
has a negative impact on both profitability and efficiency.  
Our study thus contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we extended 
studies on multiple blockholders by looking at the heterogeneity of blockholders.  We argue 
that the way shares are distributed across blockholders with different identities plays a 
significant role in determining the impact of governance arrangements on performance. We 
claim that looking only at the concentration/dispersion of shares, without considering also the 
identity of shareholders, provides only a partial perspective to study principal-agent or 
principal-principal problems. Second, we suggest that - given the increase of complexity and 
dynamism in ownership structures around the world, and in particular in emerging countries - 
traditional agency theory may be not sufficient to fully understand how internal governance 
systems affect firms’ strategies and results. The recourse to multiple agency and principal-
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principal perspectives (Arthurs and Johnson, 2008; Connelly et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 
2002; Young et al., 2008) can provide a deeper insight to explain what happens in multiple 
blockholders firms. Third, this study shows the importance of considering ownership 
composition among blockholders in banking studies. While the topic of ownership has been 
widely investigated in banking studies (e.g. Berger et al., 2005; Bonin et al., 2005; Caprio et 
al., 2007; Shehzad et al., 2010), most of the works have focused only on dominant or major 
shareholders, without taking into account ownership composition and the joint presence of 
blockholders with multiple identities. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present previous 
literature and discuss our research hypotheses. We also describe the context of study, the 
banking sector in Indonesia. In Section 3, we describe our sample, variables and methods. 
Section 4 presents the results of our regression analyses. In the last section (section 5), we 
conclude by summarizing our results and by discussing avenues for future research on the 
topic. 
 
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Ownership in Banking 
In the banking sector, studies of governance effects on bank performance have 
significantly flourished. In order to explain the differences in banks’ performance levels, 
several governance dimensions were analyzed: ownership structure (e.g. Caprio et al. 2007; 
Shehzad et al., 2010), ownership identity (e.g. Bonin et al. 2005; Iannotta et al., 2007), 
composition and change of the board of directors and CEO turnover (e.g. Crespi et al., 2004). 
Even though banks are a quite unique organizational context, the problem of bank governance 
does not differ greatly from the governance problem of any other organization (Andres and 
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Vallelado, 2008). The same core corporate control mechanisms that influence the governance 
of non-financial firms also influence bank operations (Caprio et al., 2007).  
As far as ownership is concerned, there are at least two important issues that have 
received special attention in banking: ownership concentration and owner’s identity or 
ownership type4. Concerning the role of ownership concentration, some empirical studies in 
the banking area, by using an approach similar to the one adopted for ownership studies in 
corporate finance, try to provide evidences on the way in which ownership concentration has 
an influence on banks’ value and performances. The study of ownership in banking provides 
contradictive results regarding the impact of ownership concentration on performance. On one 
side, some researches revealed the positive impact of ownership concentration on bank’s 
performance (e.g. Caprio et al., 2007; Ianotta et al., 2007; Shehzad, et al., 2010). Caprio et al. 
(2007), using data of 244 banks from 44 countries found that cash-flow rights by the 
controlling owner have a positive impact on the bank’s valuations. Shehzad et al. (2010), 
using data 500 banks from 50 countries found that banks with concentrated ownership have 
lower non-performing loans ratio. For Europe, Ianotta et al. (2007) use a sample of large 
banks from 15 European countries, and evaluate the impact of alternative ownership forms 
(government, mutual, private), together with the degree of ownership concentration, on 
performance and risk. The authors find that higher levels ownership concentration increases 
loan quality and lowers risk. On the other side, some results provided a different picture. 
Laeven and Levin (2009), using 279 banks from 48 countries found that cash-flow rights of 
the largest shareholders have a negative relationship with bank’s bankruptcy risk. Boujelbene 
and Zibri (2009) found that ownership concentration increase bank’s risk-taking behaviours.  
The second issue is ownership identity or ownership type. A related stream of research 
has explored the influence of different types of owners on banks’ performance. Government 
                                                          
4
 We provide more detail reviews on ownership concentration and owner’s identity literatures in Chapter 2. 
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and foreign ownership are two types of owners that have received special attention in banking 
studies. Several studies in developing countries, for instance, have found that Stated-owned 
banks tend to have lower performance, e.g. lower efficiency levels, lower profitability and 
higher nonperforming loans, as compared to privately-held banks (Beck et al., 2004; La Porta 
et al., 2002a; Megginson, 2005; Sapienza, 2004).  
Another set of studies analyzed the comparison of foreign banks performance with 
respect to other types of banks. The focus has been on comparing how foreign banks perform 
with respect to other types of banks in developed or in developing countries. For instance, 
some works though revealed that foreign banks perform better in developing countries (e.g., 
Clarke et al., 2000; Dages et al., 2000; Bonin et al., 2005); other studies have shown that 
foreign banks have an inferior performance in developed countries (e.g. DeYoung and Nolle, 
1996; Berger et al., 2000).  Other works have compared the ways in which foreign and 
domestic banks perform in both developed and developing countries. The work by Claessens 
et al. (2001) empirically documents that foreign banks are more profitable than their domestic 
counterparts in developing countries, but shows that the opposite is valid as far as developed 
markets are concerned. In much of the same vein, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) study 
banks in 80 countries over the 1988-1995 periods and find that foreign banks have higher 
margins and profits than domestic banks in developing countries, unlike the industrial 
countries, where the opposite tends to happen as the domestic outperform the foreign banks.  
The last type of ownership that has received attention in banking study is private 
domestic ownership. Although this topic has been less considered than the two previous 
types, there is a series of studies that consider the analysis of private domestic banks, in order 
to document the more nuanced and holistic view of the relationship between type of 
ownership and bank’s performances (e.g. Berger et al., 2005; Mian, 2006; Micco et al., 2004). 
Such studies usually define domestic banks by comparing them to government banks or 
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foreign banks. In emerging countries, private domestic-owned banks are usually controlled by 
a large domestic shareholder in the form of family, wealthy individuals or closed firm that is 
fully owned by a family. One of the issues that most characterizes this type of ownership is 
connected lending (lending activities to related parties). Family banks often directs a 
significant portion of their loan to firms that have connection with the owners (e.g. firms 
controlled by the owners’ relatives) and this tendency seems to confirm even in the cases in 
which these firms are inefficient (Laeven, 2001). This behaviour is observed primarily in 
developing countries with poor governance (La Porta, et al., 2003; Laeven, 2001).  
Despites numerous researches on ownership structures in the banking industry, we did 
not find any study focused on the impact of multiple blockholders on bank’s performance. 
Thus we argue that our research can bring an important to filling such gap in the literature. 
From the review of the literature related to the banking industry illustrated in Chapter 2, it 
emerges that there are two common ways to capture the ownership concentration variable in 
banking studies. The first way is by using the number of shares owned by the majority or by 
the largest shareholder (e.g Caprio et al., 2007; Laeven and Levin, 2009). The second way is 
by using dummy variables that represent banks with concentrated ownership (e.g. Boujelbene 
and Zibri, 2009; Shehzad, et al., 2010). A bank is said to have concentrated ownership if there 
is at least one large shareholder present in the bank’s ownership structure. The large 
shareholder is usually defined as the owner who has a significant amount of shares in the 
portfolio (using 10%, 20% or 50% threshold).  However, previous studies generally focus 
exclusively on majority owners but devote few attention to the distribution of ownership 
among multiple and diverse blockholders.  
In the light of recent development in the corporate governance literature (Attig et al., 
2009; Leaven and Levin, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005), neglecting the presence of multiple 
blockholdes could provide an incomplete figure of what happens in a bank’s governance 
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structure. Moreover, traditional theoretical explanations rooted in agency theory could not 
adequately address the problems and conflicts arising between different types of principals, 
rather than between the management and a single large shareholder (Connelly et al., 2010; 
Young et al., 2008). In order to address such limits, we first briefly review the more general 
literature that has investigated the influence of multiple large blockholders on performance, 
and then present a set of hypotheses based on multiple agency and principal-principal 
theories. 
 
4.2.2 Multiple large shareholders and performance 
Several studies have revealed the increased presence of large blockholders in the corporate 
governance arrangements of companies around the world. Faccio et al. (2001), for instance, 
pointed out the presence of multiple blockholders (MB) or multiple large shareholders in 
about one third of publicly-listed firms in Asian countries including Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Leaven and 
Levin (2008) found the same picture in a set of Western Europe countries including Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom. Similarly, the relevant presence of MB has been documented also in the 
U.S, a country in which ownership patterns are generally believed to be widely dispersed 
(Holderness, 2009). This evidence has persuaded many scholars to focus on the presence of 
MB and investigate its effect on firms’ market value and financial performance. 
Despite many efforts have been made to study MB, what we currently know is still 
little and the findings are still largely inconclusive. Some studies have supported the 
dissertation that the presence of MB has a positive impact on firms. For instance, Maury and 
Pajuste (2005), conduct a study on Finnish firm-level data and find that a more equal 
distribution of votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Each 
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blockholder is believed to have specific and additional incentives and abilities to influence 
management (e.g. through putting persons on the board of directors, or through liquidation) 
and monitor managerial choices that could help to curtail non-value-maximizing behaviour on 
the part of management (Gunasekarage, Hess, & Jie, 2007; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). 
Moreover, the presence of a second block shareholder can alleviate the monitoring problem. 
MB help to create contestability among block shareholders during the decision-making 
processes (Bloch and Hedge, 2001) and decrease the possibility of expropriation by a major 
shareholder at a cost for minority owners and for firm value (Attig et al., 2009).  
On the other side, other studies have predicted that MB have no impact on 
performance, others have even argued that they can have a negative impact on performance. 
Singh and Davidson III (2003) find that the presence of outside block ownership not 
necessarily reduces agency costs in listed large US corporations. The addition of a new large 
holder does not necessary mean additional monitoring since there might be a free riding 
problem. The new block shareholders could rely only on the monitoring process of the largest 
shareholders should they consider this option as the most efficient for them. As control and 
residual incomes are divided among a larger group of shareholders, the motivation and ability 
of blockholders to control diminishes (Singh and Davidson III, 2003). The effect that 
blockholders can have on performance depends on the blockholders’ ability to influence a 
firm’s strategy. Such ability is related with blockholders’ block size or direct involvement in 
the decision-making process (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 2009). The more the blockholders’ 
number increases, the more it limits the ability of smaller blockholders to effectively 
challenge the largest blockholder (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 2009; Konijn et al., 2011).  
Although previous literature has led to conflicting views about the presence of 
multiple blockholders and its impact on bank performance, we argue that the impact in this 
research is more likely to be negative, for several reasons: 1) The ownership concentration 
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matters less in countries with strong legal protection for shareholders and, on the contrary, it 
plays a significant role in countries where the shareholders protection is low (La Porta et al., 
1999). Indonesian banking, however, is characterized by a less restrictive regulatory 
environment (Sato, 2005) and thus in this institutional condition, ownership concentration in 
banks can be potentially important for bank governance (shareholder monitoring hypothesis) 
and ultimately help performance (Kim, Lee, & Rhee, 2007). 2) The specific problems in the 
banking industry, like moral hazard and asymmetric information, have determined internal 
governance mechanisms (management ownership, board composition and quality) to be 
insufficient governance mechanisms (Booth, Cornett, & Tehranian, 2002). Ownership 
concentration is associated with the research of prospective information about managerial or 
board strategies. Large share-owners then collect forward-looking information in order to 
alter the course of action of the firm, especially if the board pursues strategies against their 
interests. On the contrary, if ownerships are highly dispersed among blockholders, it may 
reduce such incentives (Tirole, 2006). Based on this argument, we argue that:  
 
Hp 1: Ceteris paribus, a higher number of blockholders is negatively associated with  
bank performance. 
Hp 2: Ceteris paribus, a higher degree of ownership concentration of blockholders is 
positively associated with bank performance. 
 
4.2.3 The heterogeneity of blockholders: insights from multiple agency and principal-
principal theories 
The above mentioned studies rely on the numbers of blockholders and distribution of shares 
among blockholders to investigate the impact of multiple blockholders presence. Such 
studies, however, tend to assume that owners are relatively homogenous, and their incentives 
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and ability to monitor are mainly influenced by their equity positions. The underlying 
assumption is that, as the shares of additional blockholders increase, so does their motivation 
and effort to influence and monitor the management of the company. However, we claim that 
neglecting other factors that might influence owner’s incentives to monitor managerial 
choices can lead to a partial understanding of what happens in multiple blockholders contexts. 
In particular, as suggested by multiple agency and principal-principal theories, we claim that 
the identity of the different blockholder is one of such relevant factors that should be taken 
into consideration. 
While agency theory focuses on the relationship between owners and managers, 
generally assuming that ownership is either widely diffused (as in public corporations) or held 
by a single large shareholder, in MB firms the relations tend to be more complex. Managers, 
in fact, will have relationships not with a single owner, but with a set of diverse owners. More 
recent developments of multiple agency theory and principal-principal theories seem to be 
better equipped to explain such contexts. Multiple agency theory examines conflict of 
interests among more than one agent group when at least one of the agents is connected with 
different principals (Athurs and Johnson, 2008; Child and Rodriguez, 2003; Connelly et al., 
2010; Filatotchev and Allcock, 2008). Thus instead of addressing a one-to-one relationship, 
multiple agency theory examines a many-to-many relationship to explain outcomes. Principal-
principal theory emphasizes the relationship between owners, focusing in particular on 
conflicts between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Most contributions under this 
perspective refer to emerging countries, where the diffuse patterns of concentrated ownership, 
combined with weak external governance mechanisms, result in frequent conflicts between 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Morck, 
Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005).  
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Both multiple agency theory and principal-principal theory emphasize critical issues in 
the analysis of firms controlled by multiple blockholders which are central for the purposes of 
our study. First, they recognize that shareholders represent an heterogenous set of actors, 
characterized by a diversity of objectives, interests, investment horizons, strategy and risk-
level preferences (Colpan et.al, 2011; Cucculelli, 2009; David et al., 2010; Hoskisson et al., 
2002; Munari, Oriani, & Sobrero, 2010; Pedersen & Thomsen, 2003). Under this light, the 
mixed results for owner influence on firm performance “[…] may be due in part to the 
preponderance of empirical studies that amalgamate diverse forms of owners despite 
important differences in their investment horizons and ability to affect firm actions” 
(Connelly et al., 2010, p. 1573). Second, both theories emphasize the importance of 
characterizing owners according to their identities in order to better identify the respective 
main interests they aim to. This passage is fundamental in order to identify cases in which 
interests are misaligned and may lead blockholders to compete with each other to gain private 
benefits.  Such settings create thus a potential for “conflicting voices” among the various 
groups of shareholders (Hoskisson et al., 2002), and also a situation in which each agent may 
face conflicting choices concerning which principals’ interests will be served.  
 
4.2.4 Heterogeneous blockholders and performance in the banking industry 
Previous studies that examined the ownership structure found that different types of 
ownership have different objectives. As a consequence, they are likely to influence in a 
different way the strategic behaviour of firms their invested in (Colpan, et al., 2011; David et 
al., 2010; Douma et al., 2006).  For instance, a study by Colpan et al. (2010) in Japan shows 
that, foreign and domestic owners have different investment objectives and strategic 
preferences, related with firm diversification strategies and capital commitment. The 
relationships between diversification strategy and firm growth are stronger for the firms with 
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higher domestic rather than foreign ownership. At the same time, the relationships between 
diversification measures and profit outcomes are more positive in cases in which foreign 
investors have higher ownership than domestic investors.   
The differences between large blockholders’ interests and objectives as they are 
postulated by multiple agency and principal-principal theories are particularly relevant for 
ownership studies in the banking sector. As a matter of fact, banks are usually associated with 
other objectives besides profit maximization (Megginson, 2005). This is due to the central 
position of banks for the whole economic system and also to the nature of their business. In 
some cases, banks are even set up in order to pursue other objectives besides profitability, 
such as agent of economic development or agent to raise fund for group of business.  The 
different additional goals followed by banks are usually related with the identity of the owners 
who control them and that usually play a big role in deciding the use of bank’s resources, such 
as, for example, the type and focus of bank’s lending to firms (La Porta et al, 2002b).  
There are three major types of blockhoders’ identities that are usually analyzed in the 
banking studies due to their relevance and diffusion in the corporate governance arrangements 
of banks across the world (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; Micco et al., 2007): the State or 
government; families and foreign financial institutions. Each type of blockholder usually has 
distinctive objectives or interests besides profitability or value. Table 4.1 provides a summary 
of bank’s objectives relative to the ownership identity. 
Government-controlled banks may play a useful credit-smoothing role since their 
lending behaviour is much less responsive to macroeconomics shocks than the lending of 
private banks, both domestically and foreign owned (Micco and Panizza, 2006). This is 
related with their function as agents of development. The very high nonperforming loan ratios 
for state-owned banks could be a reflection of the different goals and lending directives of 
these organizations, since State owners may also be concerned with advancing other social or 
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political goals (Berger et al. 2005). Family banks are usually created in order to support their 
affiliated business by providing funds for the group necessities and by creating an internal 
market within the firm in order to try to circumvent restrictions on offshore financing. 
Therefore the close interrelationships between finance and ownership in these banks increase 
the level of connected lending (Claessens et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2002b). Foreign banks 
and financial institutions’ presence in one country are strongly driven by the will to expand 
and to increase banks’ performance (Clarke et al., 2002). Since they have different priorities 
and business focuses (usually related with their portfolio diversification), their lending pattern 
tends to ignore domestic priorities (Bayraktar and Wang, 2004). Furthermore, foreign owners 
are often concerned with the value of their entire international organization, instead of 
focusing on the value of the single banks; they allocate greater shares of their lending 
portfolios to commercial and industrial loans instead of domestic banks and they have limited 
activities in small business lending (Clarke, et al., 2000).  
 
Table 4.1 
Identity of blockholders and bank’s objectives 
 
Bank’s Objectives  
Identity of the blockholder 
 Central Government Families Foreign Bank 
    
Profit maximization Low Medium to High High 
Soundness Low to medium Medium High 
Social Welfare High Low Low 
Regional development High Low Low 
Access of financial service High Low to medium Low 
Portfolio diversification Low Medium to High High 
Connected lending Medium High Low 
 
 
Thus, one condition that could make MB negatively associated with a bank’s and 
performance is the rise of potential conflicts in terms of objectives and priorities (Faccio, 
Lang, & Young, 2009). Considering such heterogeneity, we argue that the possibility of 
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conflicts is higher in banks controlled by blockholders that have different identities. This 
could ultimately decrease the bank’s performance since these downsides could exceed the 
benefit from additional monitoring. Thus: 
Hp 3: Ceteris paribus, a higher diversity in blockholders is negatively associated with 
bank performance.  
 
4.3 Multiple blockholders in Indonesian banking industry  
As follows we will provide a description of the research context in the attempt to 
explain its suitability and interestingness for the current research questions. The financial 
crisis in 1997-1998 forced the Indonesian Government to launch a complete restructuring 
program of the banking sector including nationalization of some private banks. After the 
restructuring process, the government launched a privatization program, in which some of the 
banks that had been nationalized were sold back to private investors. In addition, some of the 
state banks went public, even if the majority of shares were still held by the government. 
Moreover, there were frequent shares transfer activities in private banks from family owners 
to private investors, merger and acquisitions activities and so on.  
We can find a more and more interesting landscape as we have a closer look to the 
shares distribution of each bank. Table 4.2 provides some examples of banks that experience 
dynamic ownership distribution. We see how banks have more than one blockholders with 
different identities. Their distributions of shares are also changing frequently in 2000 -2009 
period.  Such changes do not concern only share distribution among the blockholders, but also 
the changes in type of blockholders identities. From this it is easy to see that it might not be 
sufficient to focus only on major owners in order to capture ownership structure. During 200-
2009 period, there are many banks that experience this kind of ownership structure changes in 
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Indonesia. It is interesting to investigate what is the impact of these changes, with a particular 
focus on their impact on bank performance. 
 
 
Table 4.2 
Example of Banks with Multiple Blockholders 
 
Initial Condition First Change Second Change 
 
Shares Identity Shares Identity Shares Identity 
26.87 Closed firm (Family) 24.43 Foreign 25.31 Closed firm (Family) 
20.88 Foreign 23.04 Foreign 24.43 Foreign 
18.67 Closed firm (Family) 14.14 Closed firm (Family) 23.03 Foreign 
15.52 Foreign 9.84 Closed firm (Family) 7.76 Foreign 
7.76 Foreign 7.68 Foreign 
7.68 Foreign 
Example 
1 
18.06 Public (<5%) 
13.11 Public (<5%) 
11.79 Public (<5%) 
97.17 Central government 31.55 Family firm 44.51 Family firm 
2.83 Public (<5%) 31.55 Foreign 44.51 Foreign Example 
2 
  26.17 Central government 10.98 Public (<5%) 
56.68 Central government 93.69 Central government 51.23 Foreign 
16.74 Closed firm (Family) 22.49 Central government 
Example 
3 
26.58 Public (<5%) 
6.31 Public (<5%) 
26.28 Public (<5%) 
 
  
4.4 Data and Methodology 
4.4.1 Sample and data sources 
Data on bank ownership and financial performance in Indonesia were collected from the Bank 
of Indonesia (the Indonesian Central Bank). We also used bank’s financial reports derived 
from Bankscope and information on the banks’ websites as complementary data sources. 
Using such sources, we were able to collect data on the whole population of Indonesian banks 
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over the period 2000-2009. Our final sample is constituted by 120 banks5, for a total of 1147 
observations, thus representing an unbalanced panel dataset.  
 
4.4.2 Measures 
4.4.2.1 Dependent variables 
 We measure Bank Performance, our dependent variable, using two different performance 
variables which are common in banking studies (Lin and Zhang, 2008). We use Return on 
Assets (ROA), defined as the ratio between net income and total assets, in order to measure 
profitability. We also compute the ratio of Operating Expense to Operating Revenue (OEOR) 
for measuring efficiency. Whereas a higher ROA value indicates higher profitability, a higher 
OEOR value means lower efficiency levels. 
 
4.4.2.2 Independent variables 
Our independent variables try to capture a set of ownership arrangements related to the 
presence of MB. The variable Numbers of Block (Blocks) simply counts the number of 
different blockholders present in a bank in a given year. We identify blocks of shareholders 
basing on thresholds typically adopted in previous literature (Facio and Lang, 2002; Faccio et 
al., 2001; Holderness, 2009; Konijn et al., 2011).  In our study, we define a blockholder as a 
shareholder owning shares summing to 5% or more. We use the 5% threshold since it is the 
level at which shareholders are required to reveal their ownership in Indonesia. Although 
there are some studies which also used a 10% threshold (Attig et al., 2009; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005), given the lack of an accepted theory on block ownership, the prudent course of 
                                                          
5
 We decided to exclude Islamic banks from our sample since those banks have different activities and different 
regulations from conventional banks. We also excluded the branch bank since a branch bank is only a 
representative of foreign bank that run by a country manager who is responsible to the central office. This is not 
fit with our research question that explores ownership structure.We have to exclude nine banks from our sample 
due to incomplete data on ownership structure and financial reports. Most of them are banks that were closed or 
merged at the beginning of our sample period. 
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action is to have a sample of large shareholders as broad as possible (Holderness, 2009). 
Using information from the Bank of Indonesia, we were able to identify the ultimate 
ownership stakes of each bank, so that our definition of blockholders included both direct and 
indirect voting rights (Faccio et al., 2001). 
To measure the degree of ownership concentration among blockholders 
(Concentration), we compute an Herfindhal index as done in the paper by Konijn et al. 
(2011). The index is computed as follows: 
 
Herfindahl  = [(%BlockShare1) + (%BlockShare2) + . . . + (%BlockShare5)]2 
[(%BlockShare1)2 + (%BlockShare2)2 + . . . + (%BlockShare5)2] 
 
where BlockShare1 is ownership share of the first blockholder, BlockShare2 is the ownership 
share of second blockholder, and so forth until the fifth blockholder. As done by Konijn et al. 
(2011) we use the scaled Herfindahl index, where scaling is performed using the total 
combined block ownership of the largest five blockholders. In this way, we are able to 
separate the effect of dispersion from the effect of total combined block ownership. The value 
of the Herfindal index increases as the ownership shares becomes more concentrated. 
Therefore, a low value of the Herfindahl index implies a low concentration and vice versa.  
The third ownership variable we computed, Diversity, is a measure of ownership 
distribution across different categories of block shareholders. It is computed using an entropy 
index, which represents a modification of the entropy of product diversification introduced by 
Jacquemin and Berry (1979). We use entropy to measure the level of ownership dispersion by 
taking into consideration the number of owners’ identity and the relative share of each 
identity in the total shares. To construct such variable, we first grouped blockholders into 
three different types of identity, using information provided by Bank of Indonesia: 
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Government (including in this category both central and regional governments)6; Families7 
and Foreign financial institutions8.  
We were thus able to compute the distribution of ownership shares in these three 
different categories. We then computed the entropy index as the weighted average of the 
shares of each identity group. The weight for each identity group is the logarithm of the 
inverse of its shares. Thus we computed entropy as follows: 
Entropy = ∑
=
n
i 1
 Pi ln Pi
1
 
Where, Pi represents the portion of shares of each owner’s identity group to total shares of all 
blockholders shares. A higher value of the entropy index implies a higher dispersion of shares 
across blockholders with different identities. 
 
4.4.1.3 Control variables 
We also included in our analyses a series of control variables that are commonly used in 
studies on the banking industry in order to capture bank characteristics (Coleman, Esho, & 
Sharpe, 2002; Levine, 2002). We used the natural logarithm of bank’s total asset (Size) to 
control for size effects. We then used a bank’s market share, computed in each year as the 
ratio of a bank’s asset to the total assets of the Indonesia banking industry (AssetShare), to 
control for market power effects. We also included the share of non-interest revenue on total 
revenue (NonIntRev), the ratio of risk free securities to total assets (RiskFree) and the share 
of loans to total deposits (LDR) to control for the loan portfolio orientation of each bank. We 
                                                          
6
 Concerning ownership by the central government, we included in this group large stakes held by: Ministry of 
Finance, State Agency, State-owned company, State-controlled cooperative; State-controlled foundation.  While 
in the first case the control is ultimately under the Ministry of Finance, in the case of ownership by a regional 
government the control is under a regional institution, a province or a city government. 
7
 We put also Individuals within this group, as done by Faccio and Lang (2002). We also include closed firms, 
since they are usually owned by a single individual of a family in Indonesia. 
8
 We put foreign banks or foreign financial institutions in this category.  
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then computed the ratio of fixed assets relative to total assets (FixedAss) and the ratio of 
human resources expense to total expenses (Person) to control for the resource intensity of 
the banks. We finally included year dummies to control for temporal effects on performance. 
Table 4.2 presents the summary of all such measures. 
 
 
Table 4.3 
List of Variables 
 
Variables Measures 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net income divided by total assets (Profitability) 
Operating Expense to Operating Revenue (OEOR) Operating expense divided by operating revenue  (Efficiency) 
Numbers of Blocks (Blocks) The number of blockholders  
Blockholders’ Concentration Ratio 
(Concentration) 
Herfindhal index of the ownership shares of the five largest 
blockholders 
Blockholders’ Diversity (Diversity) Entropy index of the distribution of ownership shares across 
different types of blocholders  
Bank’s Size (Size) Logarithm natural of bank’s total assets 
Bank’s Asset share (AssetShare) Bank asset to total asset of the banking industry 
Risk-free Asset Ratio (RiskFree) Risk-free asset divided by total asset 
Non-interest Income Ratio (NonIntRev) Non-interest revenue divided by total revenue 
Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) Total loan divided by total deposits 
Personal Expense Ratio (Person) Salary expense divided by total asset 
Fixed Asset Ratio (FixedAss) Fixed asset divided by total asset 
 
 
4.4.2 Methods 
The initial regression model we use in our analyses is a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model with year dummies. Following Maury and Pajuste (2005), the OLS estimates in this 
model are calculated using the fully robust variance-matrix estimator, which allows for 
within-cluster (firm) correlation and heteroskedasticity (Maury and Pajuste, 2005). The robust 
estimator assumes neither particular kind of within-cluster correlation, nor particular form of 
heteroskedasticity. This specification relaxes the independence assumption required by the 
OLS estimator just to independence among the clusters (firms).  
In the robustness check section of the paper, we also present the estimates computed 
with other regression models, in order to deal with specific econometric issues. A first critical 
   66  
issue we dealt with is represented by the problem of endogeneity. According to previous 
literature, there is reason to believe that ownership structure is to some extent affected by firm 
performance, because the controlling owners may retain control only of firms with favourable 
prospects. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that the 
market succeeds in bringing forth ownership structures that are close to optimal. They suggest 
that ownership structures are firm-specific because of the differences in the circumstances that 
firms face, such as economies of scale, regulation, and the stability of the environment in 
which they function. Moreover, a firm’s decisions, also in terms of corporate governance 
arrangements, are influenced by expected performance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). We 
therefore run additional econometric models to treat the ownership variables as endogenous. 
Following the paper of Maury and Pajuste (2005), we adopt the approach of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and use the lagged values of the ownership variables as their instrument 
variables. Since we find different changes that occur within banks in ownership over our 
sample period, we use this technique to control possible bias due to the joint endogeneity of 
our ownership variables. For example, good performance may result in higher ownership 
concentration, since the controlling owner might tend to retain control in firms with good 
performance. In this case the regression of performance on ownership variables would have 
been biased because of changes in ownership structure resulting merely from past 
performances. 
 
4.5 Analyses and Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive analyses 
We first provide some descriptive statistics about our sample. Table 4.3 illustrates the 
distribution of the banks included in our sample according to the identity of the majority 
owners. In general, the number of banks in Indonesia has decreased over time, mainly as a 
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consequence of repeated merger and acquisitions (M&A) activities which characterized the 
restructuring phase of the industry.  The number of banks that are owned by the central 
governments has decreased in the 2000-2009 period, due to the privatization processes of 
some nationalized banks. The share of family-controlled banks has also decreased, since some 
families could not afford to inject new capitals as the Central Bank increased the capital 
requirements. Besides, some family banks were closed or sold to foreign investors. On the 
other hand the numbers of banks owned by foreign investors has steadily increased as a result 
of the Central Bank policy to make the banking industry more open to foreign investments. 
 
Table 4.4 
Number of Banks in Indonesia and identities of major blockholders (2000-2009) 
Year Identity of Majority 
Owner 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Central Government 17 16 14 12 10 10 9 10 8 9 
Regional Government 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Family  59 59 57 57 56 54 53 48 41 36 
Foreign Investors 18 19 23 25 24 26 27 29 30 31 
Total 120 120 120 120 116 116 115 113 105 102 
 
 
Table 4.4 provides the distribution of banks, according to the presence of block 
holders. We found that, at the beginning of our sample period, the majority of banks 
registered the presence of multiple blockholders and that, as time passed, the numbers were 
reducing. This is the result of M&A activities and of the fact that some of majority 
shareholder were gradually buying the shares from existing blockholders. Table 4.4 
documents however a significant share of Indonesian banks controlled by blockholders with 
different identities, ranging from around 25% of the banks in 2005 to 14% of the banks in 
2009. 
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Table 4.5 
Multiple blockholders (and related identities) in Indonesian banks (2000-2009) 
Year Category 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Single Blockholder 54 55 56 56 52 51 53 56 57 59 
Multi. Block. (same identity) 42 42 41 42 39 37 41 35 33 29 
Multi. Block. (diff. identity) 22 23 23 22 25 28 21 22 15 14 
    Government & Family 8 8 5 4 5 6 4 4 2 2 
    Government & Foreign 8 5 8 7 7 6 1 1 1 0 
    Family & Foreign 6 10 10 11 13 16 16 17 12 12 
Total 120 120 120 120 116 116 115 113 105 102 
 
The results of descriptive statistic for each variable can be found in table 4.5. In order 
to avoid the impact of outlier observation, we dropped observations that have values below 
1% quartile and above 99% quartile for each dependent variable and then ran the statistical 
analysis. First, we put banks into three categorical groups based on the presence of multiple 
blockholders, which are banks without the presence of multiple blockholders ownership, 
banks with the presence of multiple blockholders ownership and banks with the presence of 
multiple blockholders with different types of ownership identities. Then, using one way 
ANOVA we investigated whether there are differences between the three groups in terms of 
their ROA and OEOR. The null Hypothesis was that there is no difference between the three 
groups in terms of their ROA. 
 
Table 4.6 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Concentration 1142 68.431 30.374 8.0884 100 
Diversity 1142 0.243 0.320 0.000 1.338 
ROA 1142 0.020 0.043 -0.521 0.320 
OEOR 1142 0.867 0.409 0.181 6.283 
Person 1142 0.021 0.019 0.001 0.457 
LDR 1142 0.750 0.545 0.012 9.290 
FixedAss 1142 0.038 0.036 0.001 0.282 
Riskfree 1142 0.193 0.163 0.000 0.928 
NonIntRev 1142 0.081 0.087 0.002 0.801 
lnAss 1142 14.398 1.864 9.375 19.730 
MSass 1142 0.008 0.025 0.000 0.270 
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Table 4.7 
Summary Statistics of ROA 
Three Groups Multiple Blockholders Banks 
 
Ownership’s Category of 
Bank 
Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
Non Multiple Blockholders  0.0293 0.0203 537 
Multiple Blockholders 0.0125 0.0251 374 
Multiple Blockholders-  
Different Owner’s Identity 0.0186 0.0268 211 
      Total  0.0217 0.0245 1,122 
 
 
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show the summary statistics of three groups. From ANOVA 
test output we found the f-value of 59.47 for ROA and 444.95 for OEOR have significances 
of less than 5%, and therefore we reject the Null Hypothesis. We also use Bonferroni 
techniques and we found that all categories create three subsets of the categories; all 3 
categories are different as all significance at 0.05 level. 
 
Table 4.8 
Summary Statistics of OEOR 
Three Groups Multiple Blockholders Banks 
              
Ownership’s Category of 
Bank Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
Non Multiple Blockholders  0.7852 0.1963 534 
Multiple Blockholders 0.8986 0.1875 370 
Multiple Blockholders-  
Different Owner’s Identity 0.9117 0.2657 211 
      Total  0.8468 0.2166 1.115 
 
 
4.5.2 Regression results 
We first ran six regression models separately for each dependent variable, ROA and OEOR, 
and each independent variable related to the presence of multiple blockholders. We 
introduced separately the ownership variables in order to avoid multicolinearity problem, 
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since Table 4.8 shows the presence of high correlation between the variables capturing the 
number of blockholders and concentration of ownerships stakes. Table 4.9 reports the results 
of our regression analyses.  
From the regression results, we can conclude several findings. Firstly, the number of 
blockholders is negatively correlated with ROA, and the relationship is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. We can conclude that the increase in the number of blockholders is associated 
with a decrease of profitability, as measured by ROA (see Table 4.9, Column II). Similarly, 
the numbers of blockholders is negatively correlated with OEOR and the coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 4.9, Column VI). This suggests that an increase 
in the number of blockholders is associated with lower efficiency levels for banks. In general, 
the results support our hypothesis that the number of blockholders is negatively related with 
bank’s performance and.  
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Table 4.9 
Correlation Matrix of All Variables 
           ROA OEOR Blocks Concentration Diversity LDR Person FixedAss RiskFree NonInt AssetShare Size 
ROA 
1.0000            
OEOR -0.6890* 1.0000           
NumLS -0.2604* 0.1928* 1.0000          
Concentration 0.3092* -0.2209* -0.8427* 1.0000         
Diversity -0.0846* 0.1374* 0.3408* -0.3803* 1.0000        
LDR 0.1214* -0.0365 0.0114 0.0105 0.1050* 1.0000       
Person -0.1799* 0.2739* 0.0685* 0.0187 -0.1510* 0.0662* 1.0000      
FixedAss -0.3426* 0.3753* 0.2287* -0.2471* -0.0908* -0.0934* 0.4986* 1.0000     
RiskFree -0.0831* 0.0065 -0.0086 -0.0483 -0.0247 -0.2986* -0.1996* -0.0711* 1.0000    
NonIntRev 0.0427 -0.0268 -0.0843* 0.0654* 0.0969* 0.1835* -0.2185* -0.1396* 0.0386 1.0000   
AssetShare 0.0203 -0.0328 -0.1454* 0.0195 0.0097 -0.0779* -0.1407* -0.1175* 0.2201* 0.1309* 1.0000  
Size 0.1732* -0.2026* -0.2308* 0.1370* 0.1149* -0.0585 -0.4060* -0.4310* 0.1384* 0.2316* 0.6499* 1.0000 
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Table 4.10 
Regression Results for ROA & OEOR 
The table presents the regression results. The p-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that 
are corrected for clustering at the firm level. We also include year fixed effect but we do not show the results for 
space reasons. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Var. ROA OEOR 
Model I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Constant 0.013    (0.454)    
0.025 
  (0.169)  
.002   
(0.888)   
0.010  
(0.566) 
0.899*** 
(0.000) 
0.811*** 
(0.000) 
0.984*** 
(0.000) 
0.944*** 
(0.000) 
         
Blocks  -0.003*** 
 (0.003) 
   0.023*** 
(0.005) 
  
Concentration   0.000*** (0.000)      
   -0.002***  
(0.000) 
 
Diversity    -0.017** (0.011) 
   0.224*** 
(0.000) 
Person -0.086   
 (0.531)     
-0.131  
 (0.352)  
-0.192   
 (0.170)    
-0.117   
 (0.408)    
2.631*** 
(0.017) 
0.010** 
(0.010) 
3.626*** 
(0.002) 
3.019*** 
 (0.009) 
FixedAss -0.212*** (0.000)     
-0.180*** 
 (0.000)  
-0.154*** 
 (0.000)  
-0.208*** 
(0.000)  
1.519***   
(0.000) 
1.268***  
0.001 
1.022*** 
(0.007) 
1.470*** 
(0.000) 
RiskFree -0.012    (0.221)     
-0.011    
(0.246)  
-0.010       
 (0.288)    
-.012 
(0.190)  
0.070 
(0.397) 
0.063 
(0.422) 
0.055  
(0.475) 
0.074 
( 0.319) 
NonIntRev -0.011    (0.511)     
-0.014   
(0.402)     
-0.016   
 (0.341)    
-.010    
(0.542) 
0.274 
(0.142) 
0.295 
(0.109) 
0.310*  
 (0.088) 
0.261   
(0.143) 
LDR 0.004  (0.307)     
0.004   
(0.251)  
0.005   
 (0.203)    
0.005   
 (0.151) 
-0.006 
(0.884) 
-0.010 
(0.811) 
-0.013   
(0.752) 
-.019 
(0.623) 
Size 0.001    
 (0.376)     
0.001 
(0.606)  
0.001 
(0.556) 
0.001  
 (0.224) 
-0.013  
(0.179) 
-0.010 
(0.287) 
-0.010    
(0.262) 
-0.018**   
( 0.059) 
AssetShare -0.039    (0.381)     
-0.047   
 (0.293) 
-0.032   
( 0.521)  
-0.054 
(0.231) 
0.461    
(0.216) 
0.528 
(0.151) 
0.411   
(0.310) 
0.665*   
(0.084) 
Num Obs. 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 
R2 15.31 19.07 21.13 17.31 16.41 19.1 21.9 20.99 
 
 
Moving to the influence of ownership concentration across blockholders on ROA, 
Table 4.9 (Column III) shows a positive coefficient of the Concentration variable, statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the increase in blockholders concentration is 
associated with the increase in ROA. The Concentration variable is negatively correlated with 
OEOR, and that the relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 4.9, Column 
VII). This suggests that the increase in blockholders concentration is associated with the 
decrease in OEOR. Our results therefore support our second hypothesis, stating that the 
increase in ownership concentration (or, alternatively, lower ownership dispersion across 
blockholders) is associated with higher bank performance (both in terms of profitability and 
efficiency).  
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Third, Table 4.9, Column IV, shows that the diversity of blockholders is negatively 
correlated with ROA, the relationship being statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, 
the coefficient of the Diversity variable is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level in the regression model with OEOR as dependent variable (Table 4.9, Column VIII). 
These results suggest that the increase in blockholders diversity is associated with the 
decrease in ROA and the increase in OEOR. We thus find support for our third hypothesis 
stating that the distribution of ownership across blockholders with different identities is 
negatively related with bank performance. The different identities of blockholders may thus 
lead to divergent objectives and conflicting voices between blockholders, ultimately 
hampering the financial results.  
Finally, it is important to notice that, even though the regression results show that 
number of blockholders and concentration are statistically significant, the magnitude of the 
coefficients are very small. On the other hand, the magnitude of the coefficient Diversity is 
larger, especially on the model using OEOR as dependent variables, thus suggesting the 
importance of considering the heterogeneity of blockholders in the studies on ownership 
structures and performance.  
 
4.5.3 Robustness check 
In this section, we address some specific econometric issues underlying our analyses. First, 
we deal with the endogeneity of ownership. Following the analysis of Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991), we use the lagged values of the ownership variables as their instrument variables. The 
results using instrumental-variable regressions reported in Table 4.10 largely confirm our 
previous findings that the number of blockholders and the blockholders’ diversity have 
negative effects on bank performance, and that the blockholders concentration has a positive 
effect on bank performance. 
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Table 4.11 
Regression Results Using Instrumental Variable 
 
The regressions include all control variables and year dummies (not showed), as in the main regression models 
presented in Table 4.9. The p-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Var. ROA OEOR 
Constant 0.033* (1.77) 
0.011 
(0.60) 
0.013 
(0.75) 
0.081*** 
(5.04) 
0.969*** 
(6.40) 
0.967*** 
(6.29) 
 
      
Predicted Blocks -0.003*** (-3.33) 
  0.025*** 
(3.11) 
  
Predicted Concentration  0.000*** (4.52) 
  -0.002*** 
(-4.02) 
 
Predicted Diversity   -0.016** (-2.36) 
  0.213*** 
(3.50) 
Num Obs. 989 1,004 1,004 987 999 999 
R2  (%) 21.32 22.83 17.51 21.13 24.47 22.34 
 
In our main regressions, we use OLS regression framework and control for clustering 
at the firm’s level (which generally reduces the t-values), e.g., we do not assume that the 
within firm variation of variables is independent. As typical in dealing with panel data, we 
have also performed additional estimates based on fixed and random effects regressions to see 
whether some unobserved firm effects may bias our results. We have run the Hausman test 
the assumptions of fixed or random effect models. The test results show that, for the model 
with ROA as dependent variables, it is fit to use the random effect models. On the contrary, 
the test rejected the possibility to use the random effect estimator for the model on OEOR, 
and therefore we applied the fixed effect estimator. The regression results reported in Table 
4.11 using random effect gave similar results to those reported in Table 4.9, based on OLS 
specification with control for clustering at the firm’s level. The fixed effect models gave us 
slightly different results, probably as a consequence of the limited variation over time of the 
ownership variables. The variable number of blockholders and ownership concentration 
turned out to be insignificant in the OEOR regression, whereas the variable blockholders 
diversity maintained its positive and statistically significant effect. These different results 
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probably are due to the fact that fixed effect model is not fit for regression with dummy 
variables as independent variables. 
 
Table 4.12 
Regression Results Using Fixed & Random Effect 
 
The regressions include all control variables and year dummies (not showed), as in the main regression models 
presented in Table 4.9. The p-values (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 ROA OEOR 
Dependent Var. 
ROA Random Effect Fixed Effect 
 
I II III I II III 
Constanta 0.034** (0.018)     
0.015 
(0.285)   
0.022 
( 0.117)    
0.960*** 
(0.000 )   
0.918*** 
(0.000)      
0.935*** 
(0.000)      
Independent Var.       
Blocks -0.003*** (0.000)     
  -0.002 
(0.778)    
  
Concentration  0.000***  ( 0.000)  
  0.000 
(0.272)  
 
Diversity   -0.009** (0.017)    
  0.120*** 
(0.001) 
Num Obs. 1,122 1,122 1,122 1,115 1,115 1,115 
R2 Overall 12.97 11.13 7.67 7.67 5.77 11.46 
 
 
Finally, we wanted to test how robust our results are to an alternative performance 
measure. As an alternative dependent variable, we thus used return on equity (ROE), which is 
calculated as the operating profit divided by total equity. Similarly, we used the ratio of 
operational or overhead costs to total costs as an alternative variable for efficiency 
measurement. We also tried to use another measures for the concentration/dispersion of 
ownership, more precisely the HHI_difference (ownership dispersion) of five largest 
blockholders measured by: (BlockShare1-Blockshare2)2 + (BlockShare2-Blockshare3)2 + 
(BlockShare3-Blockshare4)2 + (BlockShare4-Blockshare5)2 , or the sum of squares of the 
shares differences between the first and the second blockholder, the second and the third 
blockholder, the third and the forth blockholder, and the forth and the fifth blockholder (Attig 
et al., 2009; Maury and Pajuste, 2005). The findings (not reported here) are generally in line 
with those using main models. 
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4.6 Conclusions  
In this chapter, we have analyzed the effects of the presence of multiple blockholders on bank 
performance using data from Indonesian banking sector in 2000-2009. Not only have we 
focused on the distribution of ownership among blockholders, but we have also considered 
the distribution of shares between types of owners.  In line with the predictions of multiple 
agency and principal-principal theories, we argued that the identities of multiple blockholders 
play a significant role in determining the effects on final performance.  
In general we found that banks in Indonesia are mostly (55-60%) owned by single 
large shareholders. This figure is similar to a cross-country study by Caprio et al. (2007), 
showed that banks typically do not have dispersed ownership, but instead, are often controlled 
by large shareholders in term of families, foundations or the State. Moreover, Laeven and 
Levine (2009) argued that in countries with weak shareholder protection laws, size of shares 
is a crucial aspect. They found that concentrated ownership structure in those countries is 
associated with higher bank valuations.  
 We find that blockholders concentration has a positive impact both on bank’s 
profitability and efficiency. Our results thus support our second hypothesis, stating that the 
increase in ownership concentration (or, alternatively, lower ownership dispersion across 
blockholders) is associated with positive impact on bank performance. This finding is in line 
with previous ownership studies in banking (e.g. Caprio et al., 2007; Ianotta et al., 2007; 
Laeven and Levine 2009; Shehzad, et al., 2010) and corporate governance studies in 
management and finance (e.g. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002b; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Young et al., 2008) 
showing that, in developing countries characterized by weak owner protection laws,  higher 
ownership concentration may have positive effects. 
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On the contrary, we find the number of blockholders has negative effects on both 
bank’s profitability and efficiency. In general, the results support our hypothesis that the 
number of blockholders is negatively related with bank’s performance and it is in line with 
results provided by Konijn et al. (2011), and by Singh and Davidson III (2003). The increase 
on blockholders number deters bank performance because it limits the ability of smaller 
blockholders to effectively challenge the largest blockholder (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
2009; Konijn et al., 2011).  
Finally we also find that ownership dispersion across different types of blockholders 
(blockholders diversity) has negative effects on both bank’s profitability and efficiency. This 
result confirms our hypothesis that an increase in blockholder diversity has negative impact 
on bank performance. The higher blockholders diversity is, the more it increases potential 
conflicts among blockholders in terms of objectives and priorities (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 
2009). Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient Diversity is larger, especially on the model 
using OEOR as dependent variables, thus suggesting the importance of considering the 
heterogeneity of blockholders in the studies on ownership structures and performance. 
Considering such heterogeneity, we argue that the possibility of conflicts is higher in banks 
controlled by blockholders that have different identities. This could ultimately decrease bank 
performance since downsides could exceed the benefit from additional monitoring. 
Finally, we have also shown that our results are robust to different specifications and 
additional tests. The contribution to the literature on bank ownership performance, and the 
managerial and policy implications of such results will be discussed in the final chapter of the 
dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Bank’s Ownership, Business Orientation and Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
5. 1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, we have witnessed dramatic changes in bank ownership, especially 
involving transition countries (e.g. Eastern Europe countries), emerging countries (e.g. Latin 
America) and some other countries hit by the economic crisis (e.g. East Asia countries). 
Changes in bank ownership have raised interesting policy questions and invited different 
communities of scholars to analyse the impacts of such changes on banks’ performance, both 
at the micro and macro levels (Berger et. al., 2005, Bonin et al, 2005, Williams and Nguyen, 
2005). Indeed, the answer to such a research question may provide important arguments on 
whether ownership policy can be used as a meaningful strategy to actively shape the banking 
industry.  
Despite the abundance of studies on ownership or ownership changes in the banking 
literature, the impacts of governance changes are still not clear and we only have partial 
explanations about what happens during periods of governance changes. Previous works on 
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this topic usually conceive governance changes exclusively as a transfer from one type of 
ownership to another. Left unexplored are the mechanisms by which different types of owners 
may follow different kinds of goals besides profitability and thus have a different business 
orientation. Changes in governance or ownership may well reverberate on a bank’s business 
orientation and on the choices regarding its portfolio (Berger et al., 2005; Clarke et al., 2000). 
In other words, changes in a bank’s performance due to ownership changes are not only 
automatically linked to the agency problem, as often claimed (e.g. Williams and Nguyen 
2005), but they are also associated to the ways in which a bank’s strategy transforms when 
ownership changes.  Modalities and extent of the variation in a bank’s business orientation 
and asset portfolio may have an effect on performance, especially in the long-term.  
Firstly, following the methodology proposed by Berger et al. (2005), we included 
variables that control for static, selection, and dynamic effects. We analysed performances 
differences among different types of ownership: central government-controlled banks, 
regional government-controlled banks, domestic banks, joint venture-foreign banks and 
branch banks. We also analysed the impacts of privatization (through public listing and 
foreign acquisitions), foreign acquisition of domestic private banks and domestic merger and 
acquisitions (M&As) on banks’ performance. 
Furthermore, in order to better understand the impact of ownership and governance 
changes, we extended the study of ownership changes on bank’s performance by taking into 
consideration differences of business orientation among different types of ownership. We 
used Net interest Margin (NIM) determinants as a proxy for a bank’s business orientation. 
Business orientation is related with banks’ characteristics such as risk aversion level, market 
approach (focus on retail consumers vs. wholesale consumers), and diversification among 
different types of ownership (Cerruti et al., 2007; Valverde and Fernández, 2007; Williams, 
2007). We analysed the ways in which different types of ownership might have a different 
business orientation and how this orientation, in turn, affected performance.  
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We explored these questions through an empirical analysis based on a sample of 133 
banks in Indonesia, observed over the period 2000-2009. Indonesia banking provides a unique 
data-set well-fitted with our research goals. In the last decades, Indonesian banks have 
undergone remarkable changes of governance and their activities were marked by a number of 
events regarding governance changes, such as public listing, foreign acquisitions and M&As. 
The current ownership structure of the Indonesia’s banking industry allows us to see various 
forms of banks’ ownership, starting from government-controlled banks, domestic private 
banks mostly controlled by families, join-venture banks and branch banks. Such 
characteristics of the Indonesian banking industry have provided a suitable context for our 
research purposes.  
For the first analysis, we apply the same approach proposed by Berger et al. (2005) 
that looked at the static, selected, dynamic and time effects of ownership types on 
performances.  Following this approach, we differentiated the effects of ownership types on 
performance for those banks that have not faced any changes in ownership (static effect) and 
for  banks that have faced some changes in ownership (selected effect) over the sample 
period. We will also assess the short-term (dynamic effect) and long-term (time effect) impact 
of ownership changes on performances. In the second analysis, we explore how each of sub 
samples of banks, based on ownership types, has different NIM determinants.  
Our results indicate that regional banks, foreign banks and foreign branch banks 
manifest a better performance than domestic banks. We also found that banks undergoing 
privatizations and domestic M&As manifest a worse pre-event performance - in terms of 
higher overhead costs - than domestic banks that did not experience changes in ownership or 
governance. Privatizations through strategic selling to foreign investors, foreign acquisitions, 
and domestic M&As improve a bank’s efficiency in the short-run, while in the long run they 
increase a bank’s NIM.  
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Regarding NIM determinants analysis, we found different determinants for each group 
of ownership types. These findings lend support to the argument that the impact of certain 
interest margin determinants differs according to the type of bank ownership. Interestingly, 
we also observed that banks which experienced ownership changes show different NIM 
determinants different from the ones of banks that did not experience any changes in 
ownership. This result reveals that changes in a bank’s ownership, such as foreign 
acquisitions, also have an impact on a banks’ business orientation. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it shades some 
more light on what happens to banks that undertake ownership or governance changes. Many 
of previous studies tend to view governance changes only as a transfer from one type of 
ownership to another and they attribute differences in performance, prior- and post-ownership 
change, only to the management ability associated with each type of ownership (e.g. Williams 
& Nguyen, 2005). Our analysis provides strong support for the notion that changes in 
ownership might shift a bank’s business orientation and this, in turn, have an impact on a 
bank’s performance. On this basis, information about the ways in which banks conduct their 
business after governance or ownership changes is crucial to gain a better understanding of 
the impacts of ownership changes on performance.  
Second, it extends the study on NIM determinants (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000; 
Valverde and Fernández, 2007; Williams, 2007) by analysing how NIM determinants differ 
depending on the bank’s ownership-type and on the existence of governance changes. The 
concept that determinants of banks’ interest margins might differ by banks’ ownership-type 
has not been properly explored in the literature so far. We suggest that the sources of interest-
income and expenditures differ by banks’ ownership. Thus, different banks’ owners have 
different incentives, and consequently different strategies, when setting margins.  
Third, our study provides a broader picture about the impacts of different types of 
banks ownership on performance. Only a few studies (Berger et. al., 2005, Bonin et al, 2005, 
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Williams and Nguyen, 2005) document the more nuanced, holistic view of state, foreign, and 
domestic ownership of banks. However, those studies did not capture some types of 
ownership which are common in emerging countries, such as regional banks and branch 
banks.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of 
previous literatures that are related with our study. We will discuss the literatures on 
ownership in banking study. We will only provide brief summary of those literatures, since 
we already described them in more details in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Moreover, we will 
also discuss previous literatures on NIM. Since we have not discussed literatures on NIM in 
Chapter 2, so in this section we will go into more details on these literatures. Section 3 will 
present a brief overview of the banking industry in Indonesia, especially the one related with 
ownership and governances changes that happened. Section 4 consists of two parts. In the first 
part, we will describe our sample and data. The second part discusses our empirical model 
and the methodology we used. Section 5 will report the empirical results. Section 6 will 
conclude with a brief summary focusing on the comparison of our results with the results of 
previous works related with our topic. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Banks’ ownership and performance 
As shown in Chapter 2, a related stream of research has explored the influences of 
different types of owners on banks’ performance (e.g. Claessens et al., 2001; Micco, et al., 
2007; Berger et. al., 2005, Bonin et al, 2005, Williams and Nguyen, 2005). Within this 
framework, government and foreign ownerships are the two forms that have traditionally 
received central attention. Another common ownership type that characterizes the banking 
industry is the domestic large shareholder. Some studies in this stream take a further step by 
analysing the impact of ownership or governance change on performance (e.g. Berger et. al, 
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2005; William and Nguyen, 2005). Many studies on governance or ownership changes in the 
banking industry are grounded on transition countries (e.g. Grigorian and Manole, 2002; 
Bonin et al., 2005), since changes in governance are usually driven by a liberalization or 
deregulation of the banking industry, often linked to a strong shift in the economic system 
similar to the one experienced by east European countries in the beginning of 1990s. Another 
research context often explored by studies of governance changes is constituted by all those 
countries which have been hit by an economic crisis (e.g. Williams and Nguyen, 2005). Not 
only such countries usually have to open up their economies to deal with the impacts of the 
crisis, but they also need to implement a complete reconstruction of their financial sector, 
since this is usually the one wrecked the most by the crisis. As a matter of fact, the economic 
crisis is usually followed by many ownership changes, as demonstrated by a study by 
Williams and Nguyen (2005) that assessed governance changes in several Asian countries hit 
by the economic crisis in 1997.  
Firstly, it is important to reconstruct the whole picture about what happened. Berger et 
al. (2005) emphasized the importance to account for the static and dynamic effects of all the 
major types of governance in one model of bank performance and they showed how, 
excluding one of those relevant effects could provide biased and misleading results. Secondly, 
despite the abundance of studies on ownership in the banking industry, little is still known 
about the impact of ownership changes on performance. Moreover, Berger et al. (2005) 
maintain that changes in ownership also modify banks’ behaviour by showing that privatized 
banks shift their loan portfolio to more profitable loans. However, they did not give further 
explanation about the relationship between changes in ownership and changes in business 
orientation. Performance changes due to ownership changes are not only a matter of agency 
problems, as often claimed. It is important to consider that factors that determine changes in 
performance might be due to ownership rearrangements that ultimately translate into 
modifications of a bank’s strategy. The mechanisms by which different types of owners may 
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follow different kinds of goals besides profitability, and thus pursue different strategies or 
portfolios, are still largely left unexplored. Previous studies on the topic of ownership 
revealed that usually different types of ownership have different objectives. As a 
consequence, they are likely to influence the strategic behaviour of their invested firms in 
different ways (Colpan, et al., 2011; David et al., 2010; Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006).   
 
5.2.2 NIM determinants in the banking industry 
Another stream of studies in the banking industry tries to decompose the factors underlying a 
bank’s performance, and one performance indicator that was widely studied is the Net Interest 
Margin (NIM) (e.g. Barajas et al., 2000; Ho and Saunders, 1982; Saunders & Schumacher, 
2000). The Net Interest Margin (NIM) is defined as the ratio of the spread between a bank’s 
interest earnings and expenses to total earning assets (Saunders & Schumacher, 2000). NIM is 
important not only because this measurement can be used as a performance indicator for 
individual banks and the banking industry as a whole, but also because it can be used to 
analyse the ways in which banks conduct their strategies. Following the 
dealership/intermediation model, first introduced by Ho and Saunders (1981), banks are 
assumed to be intermediates that collect deposits and grant loans. NIM is a function of the 
interest that is charged to loans (price) and of the interest rates that banks pay to depositors 
(cost). Thus, NIM ultimately reflects the price of the intermediation services provided by 
banks (Williams, 2007). From an industrial point of view, it is still not clear whether high 
margins are good or band for the banking industry and social welfare (Williams, 2007). On 
the one hand, high margins may indicate problems in the regulatory banking environment and 
information asymmetry. On the other hand, higher margins can improve a bank’s profitability, 
strengthen a bank’s capitalization and solidify a bank’s financial position by creating 
additional buffers against negative shocks (Barajas et al., 2000).  
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A number of studies have examined the determinants of banks’ interest margins. 
While NIM reflects the price margin that banks charge, NIM determinants refer to the factors 
that influence banks in setting the level of that margin. We can categorize such determinants 
into two groups, the first one related with internal bank factors and the second with external 
factors. We define internal factors as a bank’s business orientation related with banks’ 
characteristics such as risk aversion level, market approach (retail vs. wholesale), and 
diversification (Cerruti et al., 2007; Valverde and Fernández, 2007; Williams, 2007). Instead, 
external factors are mainly related with market competition and economic conditions 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004) 
One of the most influential models in the analysis of interest margin determinants is 
the dealership model proposed by Ho and Saunders (1981). According to this model, an 
important factor influencing the size of a bank’s margin is related with the level of bank’s risk 
aversion. More recent studies try to complete the model by introducing new variables that are 
not considered in the dealership model. For instance, Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara 
(2004) proposed to consider the presence of cost inefficiencies associated with the production 
process, by explicitly incorporating the role of operating costs and providing a detailed 
description of the link between riskiness and the margins. The authors (Maudos and de 
Guevara, 2004) present a model which specifically differentiates between market risks and 
credit risks, as well as their interaction as separate factors affecting the margins.  
One variable that is believed to have a substantial influence on bank’s margins is 
ownership. As mentioned, sources of interest income and expenditures differ by banks’ 
ownership (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000; Martinez-Peria & Mody, 2004). Thus, 
different banks’ owners have different incentives, and consequently different strategies, when 
setting margins. The fact that determinants of banks’ interest margins might differ by banks’ 
ownership has not been properly investigated in the literature so far. Previous studies 
accounted for ownership only by introducing a dummy variable for it and assuming that the 
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impact of interest margin determinants would be the same across banks with different 
ownership structures (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000; Martinez-Peria & Mody, 2004). 
Results on the ways in which ownership impacts on NIM are still contradictive, especially if 
we compare the results collected in developed countries to the ones gathered in developing 
countries. Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (2000) observed that foreign banks accomplish higher 
margins than domestic banks in developing countries. The opposite conclusion holds for 
developed countries, in which domestic banks realize higher interest margins. In a follow-up 
study, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) showed that foreign banks in Latin American 
countries exhibit lower interest margins than domestic banks. 
In order to give a contribution to the literature on NIM determinants, we will focus on 
the different typologies of bank ownership and assess the differences of margin determinants 
among different types of owners. By doing this, we will analyse how a bank’s business 
orientation transforms according to different ownership types. We will use a broad set of 
ownership types, including central government-controlled banks, regional government-
controlled banks, private domestic or family-owned banks, foreign joint-venture banks and 
foreign branch banks. We will also investigate banks that experienced ownership changes in 
order to evaluate how rearrangements in ownership affect NIM.  
 
5.3 The research context: the Indonesian banking system 
There are three major policies conducted by the Indonesian government and the central bank 
to reshape and fortify the banking sector after the financial crisis in 1997-1998. First, the 
government started to launch a privatization program in 2001 when economic conditions were 
relatively stable. Some of the banks that had been nationalized were sold back to private 
investors, and especially to foreign ones. In addition, some of the state banks went public, 
even if the majority of shares were still held by the government.  Second, the Government 
relaxed the ownership regulation regarding the foreign ownership. The government allowed 
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foreign investors to control up to 99% shares of a bank’s ownership. Foreign investors were 
also allowed to take over domestic ones, including banks that participated in the privatization 
program. Third, Central bank tried to increase the strength of the banking industry by raising 
the capital requirements for banks. This policy also prompted some bank owners whose have 
limitation in financial support, to look for partners in order to increase bank capital. 
Increasing economic pressure on the banking industry pushed family owners to sell part of 
their shares to other investors. As a consequence, numerous family-owned private banks 
began to strategic actions such as selling shares to foreign investor, going public, or doing 
merger and acquisition activities.  
Before the economic crisis in 1997, the central bank grouped banks into five cluster 
base on bank’s ownership: central government banks, regional banks (owned by the province 
government), private domestic banks, foreign joint venture banks and foreign branch banks. 
This categorization was relevant before the 1997-1998 crises since it truly reflected the 
ownership condition of banks. Since there were significant changes in the ownership of 
banks, we suggest using different approaches to group banks. In this study we decided to 
group banks based on the identity of major owners or of the largest shareholders. Looking at 
the Indonesian banking industry in these days, we can divide banks into four groups, based on 
the different ownership identities that exist: central government banks, regional government 
banks, foreign banks, and Private domestic or family banks. The use of this categorization is 
supported by previous literatures (Faccio & Lang, 2000, La Porta, et al., 1999) and by the 
actual ownership conditions in Indonesian banking. We traced the ultimate owner of each 
bank, and then we analysed its identity to group it into the fit category. We believe that this 
approach is more suitable for the current ownership conditions in the Indonesian banking 
industry. 
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5.4 Data, model, and variables 
5.4.1 Data 
As a means of investigating the effects of ownership on performance and Net Interest Margin 
determinants, we explore whether we can measure performances differences among all the 
different types of owners and whether changes in ownership or governances have an impact 
on performance. The empirical sample consists of Indonesia banks active from 2000 to 
2009.We decided to start our sample period in 2000 in order to avoid the direct effects of the 
1997-1998 financial crisis that hit Indonesia and caused a complex process of bank 
restructuring that ended in 1999.  Our final sample represents an unbalanced panel data and is 
constituted by 133 banks 9. The number of banks has decreased continuously along the sample 
period due to the fact that some of them were closed or engaged in mergers and acquisition 
activities. Data on banks’ ownership and financial performances have been collected from the 
Bank of Indonesia (Indonesian Central Bank). In addition, we used information from the 
Bankscope and banks’ websites to complete the dataset and bring further specifications. 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the banks based on the type of ownership in 2000. It 
also provides changes that happened on those banks during 2000-2009. It can be noticed that 
there are two kinds of government banks, those which are owned by the central government 
and those which are owned by the regional government. In the case of Indonesia banking, 
private domestic ownership can be mostly characterized as the ownership by 
families/individuals or a closed firm controlled by a family. As for the last category, we 
identified three types of banks in foreign ownership: the branch bank, the joint venture bank. 
In addition two this two forms of foreign bank, there is also foreign-acquired bank which is 
domestic bank that is taken over by a foreign investor. 
 
                                                          
9
 In 2000 we count 148 banks registered in Bank Indonesia (Indonesia central bank). We excluded one 
government bank since it only specialized in credit for export and import and two Islamic banks since these 
banks have different kinds of financial products and reports.  We also excluded 12 banks due to incomplete data.  
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Table 5.1 
The Distribution of Banks Based on Ownership Types 2000 
 
Type of Ownership Period 2000 Period 2000-2009 
 Total Banks No Changes Changes 
Central Government 18 a 0 6 (public listing) 
6 (merger b) 
6 (foreign acquisition) 
Regional Government 26 26 0 
Private Domestic 81 30c 17 (foreign acquisition) 
23 (M&As) 
11 (closed) 
Foreign 23 14 9 (closed) 
Branch  10 10d 1 (closed) 
 
a
 Including recapitalized and nationalized banks 
b
 The merged bank then sold to the foreign investor 
c
 Including two Islamic banks 
d One branch bank was opened in 2003 
 
 
5.4.2 Models and Variables 
Our first analysis focuses on the effects of a change in ownership on bank performance. 
Following the methodology originally proposed by Berger et al. (2005), we evaluate the static 
effects of maintaining different types of governance in the long term, the selection effects 
associated with different types of ownership changes and the dynamic effects of the two types 
of ownership changes. The basic regression model takes the following form: 
 
(1) Bank Performance Measure = Constant + β1*Static Ownership Indicators  
+ β2*Selection Ownership Indicators + β3*Dynamic Ownership Indicators Dummies  
+ β4*Dynamic Ownership Indicator Years Since + β5*Control variables  
+ γ1*Year Fixed Effects + Error Term 
 
For our second analysis, we use a panel regression estimator to evaluate the impacts of 
various determinants on banks’ interest margins among Indonesia banks that are characterized 
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by different ownership structures. We focus of NIM determinants that were related with a 
bank’s characteristic. Our empirical specification takes the following form:  
 
(2) Net interest Margin = Constant + β1*LnAss + β2*LDR + β3*RiskFree + β4*LoanAllow  
+ β5*PersonalExp+ β6*FixedAss + γ1*Year Fixed Effects + Error Term 
 
The variables specified in (1) and (2) are defined in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. Below, 
we will discuss the main variables by using the following categories: measures of 
performance, measures of governance changes, and NIM determinant variables. 
 
5.4.2.1 Performance variables 
In the bulk of our empirical analysis we focused on four performance measures. First, we 
used two measures of bank profitability, return on assets (ROA), defined as profits relative to 
total assets, and Net Interest Margin (NIM), define as the difference between the interest 
income generated and the amount of interest paid out, relative to the amount of earning assets. 
Next, we measured efficiency using the operating expense to operating income ratio (COI) 
and overhead cost ratio (non-interest expense to total assets).  
 
5.4.2.2 Governance change variables 
To analyse banks’ changes in ownership, we employed the framework developed by Berger et 
al. (2005) whereby static, selection, and dynamic effects are considered together. This 
framework has already been applied to analyse different research contexts such as Argentina 
(Berger et al., 2005), Brazil (Beck et al., 2005a), Nigeria (Beck et al., 2005b) and South East 
Asia (Williams and Nguyen, 2005). We have developed different variables in order to grasp 
the different phenomena that are specific to our research context.  
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The static dummy variables identify those banks that have not faced any change in 
ownership over the sample period. Four static dummy variables are introduced, one for 
domestic banks (static_domestic), one for regional domestic banks (static_regional), one for 
foreign banks (static_foreign bank), and one for branch banks (static_foreign branch). These 
dummy variables equal 1 for the corresponding banks for all time periods. All the central 
government banks have experienced privatization processes either through strategic selling or 
public offering. This is why we have chosen to cluster them within the selection dummy 
variables. Domestic banks comprise the excluded reference cases, and thus the coefficients on 
the static dummies measure performance differences between the domestic banks and other 
groups of banks that maintain the same ownership structure. 
The selection dummy variables identify those banks that have faced some change in 
ownership over the sample period. Five selection dummy variables are introduced, one for 
government banks that were privatized by strategic selling to foreign investors or foreign 
banks (selection_priv. foreign), one for government banks that were privatized by public 
listings (selection_priv. listing), one for banks whose majority was acquired by foreign banks 
or firms (selection_foreign acquisition), one for domestic banks that experienced mergers 
and acquisitions (selection_domestic M&As), and one for banks that were closed or exited 
from the industry (selection_closed). The selection dummy variables equal one for the 
corresponding banks for all time periods. In the regression, the coefficients of the selection 
dummies identify the performance difference between domestic banks and the groups of 
banks that have been selected to undergo some types of ownership change. We intentionally 
separated banks that experienced privatization into two different groups since we found 
different characteristics between these two groups. Firstly, banks that experienced 
privatization through public listing were owned by the government even before the1997 crisis 
occurred, while banks that experienced privatization through foreign acquisitions were 
formerly owned by domestic private shareholders, before banking restructuring in 1999. 
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Secondly, banks that experienced privatization through public listing were still under control 
by the Central Government since the government still owned the majority of shares. On the 
contrary, banks that experienced privatization through foreign acquisitions are controlled by 
foreign investors now. 
The dynamic dummy variables identify those banks for which the selection dummies 
take the value 1 to capture the precise moment in which the ownership change took place. 
Four dynamic dummy variables were introduced, one for government banks that were 
privatized through public offering (dynamic_priv. listing), one for government banks that 
were privatized through strategic selling to foreign investor or foreign bank (dynamic_priv. 
foreign), one for domestic banks whose majority of shares was acquired by a foreign bank or 
firm (dynamic_foreign acquisition) and one for domestic banks that experienced merger and 
acquisitions (dynamic_domestic M&As). We did not consider the dynamic dummy variable 
for closed banks since we obviously could not have data succeeding the moment of closure. 
These dynamic dummy variables equal one for the corresponding banks for all time periods 
starting from the second year following the given intervention, and equal zero for the periods 
prior to the ownership change and for all periods in which the banks did not experience any 
ownership changes. The dynamic dummy variables capture the one-time changes in 
performance that arise at the time of the interventions. 
However, interventions may be persistent, that is, they may also have a long-term 
impact. We therefore introduce variables that measure the time that has elapsed since the 
event occurred. Since we use yearly observations in our sample, these variables are measured 
with an annual frequency. Four dynamic time indicators are introduced, one for banks that 
have been privatized through public offering (time_priv. listing time), one for banks that have 
been privatized through strategic selling to foreign investor or foreign bank (time_priv. 
foreign), one for banks that were at least partially acquired by a foreign firm (time_foreign 
acquisition), and one for banks that have experienced merger and acquisitions (time_domestic 
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M&As). Typically, the time variable equals one in the year following the change, two in the 
second year following the change, and so on10.  
 
5.4.2.3 NIM determinants 
We consider six main determinants of bank interest margins, especially that related with 
bank’s business orientation: risk aversion level, market approach and diversification (Cerruti 
et al., 2007; Ho and Saunders, 1981; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Valvedere 
and Fernandez, 2007; Williams, 2007). The first variable of bank’s business orientation is risk 
aversion level. The ratio of government securities held to total assets (RiskFree) is used as a 
proxy for bank risk aversion. As the government security is more liquid than the loan, a 
higher proportion of government securities in total assets indicate a greater risk aversion and 
it is expected to reflect in lower margins.  
The second variable that related with bank’s business orientation is market approach. 
We used fixed asset to total asset ratio (FixedAss) to proxy banks coverage, since the largest 
part of a bank’s fixed asset is constituted by their branches and offices, including all the 
equipments used for bank services (e.g. ATM machines). A bank may choose to focus upon 
the retail segment, with its associated distribution costs or a less costly (in terms of 
distribution costs) wholesale focus. Each of these strategies may yield identically sized loan 
portfolios but generate differences in cost structures. Given that there is some heterogeneity in 
the bank size and strategy, it is felt that controlling for these differences in the study sample is 
appropriate. This retail intensiveness will be measured by the individual bank branch network. 
It would be expected that those banks with larger branch networks would have higher 
production costs per loan and that these costs would be reflected in the bank net interest 
                                                          
10Following Berger et al. (2005) and Nakane and Weintraub (2005), we deleted observations in the year of and 
the year following the events. Thus, the time variable starts with two for the second year following the change. 
This treatment mitigates noise associated with the ownership change, for example, the legal fees, consultant 
expenses, due diligence costs, updating of strategies, etc. 
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margin.  On the one side, the increase in fixed effect ratio can lead to wider bank coverage 
and thus can increase bank’s interest margin. On the other hand, higher fixed assets could also 
decrease the interest margin since fixed asset is a non-interest bearing assets. Therefore, we 
do not have a particular prior estimation regarding the expected sign of this coefficient.  
Finally we use LDR to proxy bank’s diversification.  LDR is the ratio of loan to 
deposits. The higher of LDR means that bank more focus to have revenue form lending 
activities. Since bank put most of its fund for lending activities. LDR also proxy of the 
liquidity risk faced by banks. Loan is the part of a bank’s assets that gives the highest return. 
However loans are also an illiquid asset. Thus an increase of loans in relation to the deposits 
of the bank means a higher liquidity risk for the bank and the margins. Table 5.3 provides 
description summaries of the individual variables, as well as of the anticipated sign of their 
impact based on the theoretical argumentation. 
Additionally, we put three other indicators that reflect banks’ characteristics. LnAss is 
the logarithm of total assets, included as a proxy for the size of operations. The theoretical 
model predicts a positive relationship between the size of operations and margins, since for a 
given value of credit and market risk, larger operations are expected to be connected to a 
higher potential loss. On the other hand, economies of scale suggest that banks that provide 
more loans should benefit from their size and have lower margins. Therefore, we do not have 
a particular prior estimation regarding the expected sign of this coefficient. CreditRisk 
measures the credit risk faced by individual banks. We us the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans as proxy for credit risk. Banks with a higher ratio of allowance for doubtful loans 
face higher credit risk, and this is likely reflected in the charging of higher margins. 
PersonExp is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. This measure captures the impact 
of operational costs on the margin. Banks that incur in high operational costs tend to transfer 
these costs to their customers by increasing interest margins, so the estimated coefficient is 
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expected to be positive. As a result, the estimated coefficient for this variable is expected to 
be negative. 
 
Table 5.2 
Variables employed in governance changes models 
 
Symbol Description 
ROA  Return on asset 
OEOR Operating expense to operating revenue 
NIM Net interest Margin 
OH Non-interest expense to total asset 
static_domestic  Dummy indicating a domestic private bank that underwent no changes in ownership over the entire 
2000–2009 interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
static_regional  Dummy indicating a regional bank that underwent no changes in ownership over the entire 2000–2009 
interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
static_foreign Dummy indicating a foreign bank that underwent no changes in ownership over the entire 2000–2009 
interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
static_branch Dummy indicating a foreign branch bank that underwent no changes in ownership over the entire 
2000–2009 interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
selection_priv. listing Dummy indicating a state-own bank that underwent a public listing over the entire 2000–2009 interval. 
Equals 1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
selection_priv. foreign Dummy indicating a state-own bank that underwent a strategic selling to foreign investor over the 
entire 2000–2009 interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
selection_foreign 
acquisition 
Dummy indicating a domestic bank that underwent a strategic selling to foreign investor over the entire 
2000–2009 interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
selection_domestic M&As Dummy indicating a domestic bank that underwent a strategic selling to foreign investor over the entire 
2000–2009 interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
selection_closed Dummy indicating a state-own bank that underwent closing over the entire 2000–2009 interval. Equals 
1 or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
dynamic_ priv. listing Dummy indicating the years following a bank’s privatization through public listing. Equals 0 prior to 
the bank’s change and 1 starting the second year following the change. Observations in the year of and 
the year following the change are deleted. Equals 0 for all periods for banks that did not undergo a 
privatization through public listing. 
dynamic_ priv. foreign 
acquisition 
Dummy indicating the years following a bank’s privatization through strategic selling. Equals 0 prior to 
the bank’s change and 1 starting the second year following the change. Observations in the year of and 
the year following the change are deleted. Equals 0 for all periods for banks that did not undergo a 
privatization through foreign acquisition. 
dynamic_ foreign 
acquisition 
Dummy indicating the years following a domestic bank’s strategic selling to foreign investor. Equals 0 
prior to the bank’s change and 1 starting the second year following the change. Observations in the year 
of and the year following the change are deleted. Equals 0 for all periods for banks that did not undergo 
a foreign acquisition. 
dynamic_ domestic M&As Dummy indicating the years following a bank’s merger and domestic acquisition. Equals 0 prior to the 
bank’s change and 1 starting the second year following the change. Observations in the year of and the 
year following the change are deleted. Equals 0 for all periods for banks that did not undergo a merger 
and domestic acquisition. 
Time_ priv. listing Number of years since a privatization through public listing. Equals 0 for all periods prior to a 
privatization bank’s public listing and starts with 2 for the second year following the change. 
Observations in the year of and the year following the change are deleted 
time_ priv. foreign 
acquisition 
Number of years since a privatization through foreign acquisition. Equals 0 for all periods prior to a 
privatization bank’s foreign acquisition and starts with 2 for the second year following the change. 
Observations in the year of and the year following the change are deleted 
Time_ foreign acquisition Number of years since a foreign acquisition. Equals 0 for all periods prior to a bank’s foreign 
acquisition and starts with 2 for the second year following the change. Observations in the year of and 
the year following the change are deleted 
Time_ domestic M&As Number of years since a merger and acquisition. Equals 0 for all periods prior to a bank’s merger and 
acquisition, and starts with 2 for the second year following the change. Observations in the year of and 
the year following the change are deleted 
Lnasset Log of total assets in period t _ 1 for each bank. 
Loans to banks ratio The percentage of loans to banks to total assets 
Fee income ratio The percentage of non-interest revenues in total revenues. 
Year fixed effects  Year dummies, with 2000 excluded as the base case. 
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Table 5.3 
Variables employed in NIM determinants models 
 
Symbol Description Anticipated sign 
PersonExp The ratio of personnel expenses to total assets +
 
RiskFree The ratio of government or risk-free securities held to total assets - 
CreditRisk The ratio of allowance for doubtful loans to total loans + 
LnAss The logarithm of total assets +/- 
FixedAss The ratio of fixed asset to total asset  +/- 
LDR The ratio of loan to deposits  + 
 
 
We argue that determinants of a bank’s interest margins might differ by bank ownership. For 
this purpose, we have grouped banks into five sub-samples: central government-controlled 
banks, regional government-controlled banks, domestic private banks, foreign-owned banks 
(including branch bank) and Foreign-acquired. We categorized each bank into one of these 
groups based on the identity of the large shareholders who owned the majority of shares 
(more than 50%). We estimated NIM determinant model in each ownership subsamples, to 
capture differences in the interest margin determinants among different types of ownership.  
 
5.5 Empirical results 
5.5.1. Ownership, Governance changes and performance 
We first report the results of our main tests of the effects of ownership changes on the 
considered bank performance measures. We then briefly discuss the findings on the relation 
between ownership structure and bank performance. Table 5.4 shows the distribution of the 
sample based on ownership and governance changes. The numbers of observation that we use 
for regression are different with the sample we collected due to some missing values and the 
exclusion of outlier data that would harm the regression result11. 
                                                          
11
 For each variable, we accounted for potential outliers by dropping 1 percentile from both tails. We also 
dropped banks of which we had only one year data since we ran panel data regression. 
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Table 5.4 
The Distribution of the Samples 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Domestic 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 280 
Regional 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 260 
Foreign 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 140 
Branch 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 97 
Gov listing 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 60 
Gov FA 12 12 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 76 
FA 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 14 12 12 145 
M&A 18 18 17 17 15 14 14 13 8 7 137 
Closed 4 4 5 5 3 3 2 2 1 1 30 
Total 133 133 128 129 125 124 123 121 112 111 1235 
 
 
Table 5.5 reports the results for all regressions we have done. For each dependent 
variable we ran two different regressions. We excluded control variables in the first regression 
and plugged them in the second one.  We found differences in the estimated coefficients of 
those two regressions, especially in the model which uses NIM as a dependent variable. We 
suggest this happened because control variables which are proxies of a bank’s characteristics 
have a correlation with the type of ownership and they jointly influence performances, 
especially NIM. This figure is in line with our premise of second analysis that different types 
of ownership have different characteristics or business orientation, thus each type of owners 
might influenced differently by a set of NIM determinants.  
We will only discuss the results of the regression that included control variables, since 
it provides more robust results. As far as the static effects are concerned, results show that the 
estimated coefficients of regional banks dummy are positive and significant for ROA, NIM 
and OH. Instead, the estimated coefficient for OEOR was negative and significant. This 
means that regional banks have higher profitability (in term of ROA and NIM) and higher 
productivity efficiency (proxy by OEOR) than domestic banks. However, regional banks’ 
operating efficiency (proxy by OH) was lower than the one of domestic banks. The estimated 
coefficients of foreign and branch banks were both positive and statistically significant in the 
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ROA regression. Instead, in the OEOR regression their estimated coefficient was negative and 
statistically significant. We also find that the estimated coefficient of foreign banks is 
negative and statistically significant in the OH regression. However, we found that the 
estimated coefficient of branch bank was not statistically significant, although it also takes a 
negative sign. We observed that the estimated coefficients of foreign and branch banks for 
NIM were both positive but not statistically significant. This means that foreign and branch 
banks have higher profitability than domestic banks in term of ROA, but not in terms of NIM. 
They also show higher production and operation efficiency as compared to domestic banks.  
Regarding the selected variables, the results show that the estimated coefficient for 
privatized banks (through public listings and foreign acquisitions) and M&As banks are 
positive and statistically significant in OEOR and OH regression. This means that privatized 
bank and M&As banks have lower efficiency than domestic banks that experienced no 
governance changes. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of M&As banks in ROA regression 
is negative and statistically, thus banks that underwent M&As have a lower profitability than 
domestic banks that experienced no governance changes. Regarding banks that exited during 
sample period, we find that the estimated coefficient in NIM regression was negative and 
statistically significant, thus we argue that closed banks have lower net interest margins than 
domestic banks that experienced no governance changes. This result suggests that banks will 
exit the industry only after they experience a negative margin. Finally, we do not find 
evidence that banks which had undergone a foreign acquisition are significantly different 
from domestic banks in terms of profitability and efficiency.  
In evaluating the dynamic effects of privatization (through public listing and strategic 
selling to foreign investor), foreign acquisitions to private domestic banks, and domestic 
M&As, we note that the estimated coefficients of the foreign acquisition in privatization 
programs and domestic bank acquisitions are negative and statistically significant in the OH 
regression. This suggests that in the short run changes in bank’s ownership into foreign 
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ownership and domestic M&As decrease the level of overhead costs (increase the levels of 
operating efficiency). However, the estimated coefficients of dynamic M&As is negative and 
statistically significant in the NIM regression. This result leads to the conclusion that in the 
short run merger and acquisitions might lead to a decrease in interest margins. We find that 
estimated coefficients of dynamic listing were not statistically significant for all endogenous 
variables. Finally, we do not find evidence that privatization, foreign acquisitions, and 
domestic M&As have impacts on ROA in the short run. 
The estimated coefficients of dynamic time variables for foreign acquisitions (both in 
privatization programs and domestic private bank take over), and domestic M&As are 
positive and statistically significant in NIM regression. In the long run, foreign acquisition 
and merger and acquisitions seem to increase the bank’s interest margin. However, we can not 
find evidence about the impacts on efficiency.  Instead, the estimated coefficient of dynamic 
time variable for foreign acquisition of domestic private banks is positive and statistically 
significant in the OH regression.  
Finally, when we turn to time-indicator variables, we found that the estimated 
coefficients for foreign acquisitions (both privatization and general foreign acquisitions) and 
domestic M&As were positive and statistically significant in NIM regression. This result 
means that, in the long-run, foreign acquisitions and M&As increase the level of NIM. The 
new owner usually tends to come up with new strategies and a refreshed business orientation. 
While economization measures can be carried out in a relative short period of time, the 
implementation and results of new strategies usually require longer periods of time. In 
addition, in the long-run we can find that foreign acquisitions and M&As have a significant 
impact on the reduction of overhead costs. Moreover, we observed that, in the long-run, 
foreign acquisitions (excluding privatization foreign acquisitions) increase the level of 
overhead costs. 
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Table 5.5 
Regression results – Ownerships on Performances 
 
The table presents the regression results. The t-stats (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors that are 
corrected for clustering at the firm level. We also include year fixed effect but we do not show the results for 
display’s space reason. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 ROA OEOR NIM OH 
Constanta 0.014*** 
(3.94) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.920*** 
(32.53) 
1.190*** 
(11.34) 
0.055*** 
(13.24) 
0.135*** 
(7.67) 
0.035*** 
(13.04) 
0.104*** 
(7.40) 
Static         
Regional 
Government 
0.017*** 
(4.62) 
0.015*** 
(3.62) 
-0.145*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.108*** 
(-3.85) 
0.035*** 
(6.41) 
0.043*** 
(7.51) 
0.004 
(1.13) 
0.012*** 
(3.29) 
Foreign 0.019*** 
(3.37) 
0.017** 
(2.54) 
-0.208*** 
(-4.02) 
-.238*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.013** 
(-2.25) 
0.005 
(0.63) 
-0.011** 
(-2.32) 
-0.015** 
(-2.46) 
Branch .011** 
(2.20) 
0.013** 
(2.06) 
-0.138*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.257*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.024*** 
(-4.04) 
0.011 
(1.14) 
0.003 
(0.47) 
-.009 
(-0.89) 
Selected         
Privatization-
Listing 
-0.004 
(0.25) 
-0.008 
(-1.24) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
0.079* 
(1.76) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.03) 
0.007 
(0.72) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.74) 
0.012* 
(1.94) 
Privatization-
Foreign Acquisition 
0.003 
(0.17) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
0.012 
(0.16) 
0.053 
(0.46) 
0.006 
(0.21) 
0.040 
(1.38) 
0.007 
(0.65) 
0.024*** 
(3.29) 
Foreign Acquisition -0.004 
(-0.91) 
-0.005 
(-1.26) 
0.014 
(0.41) 
0.015 
(0.54) 
-0.010* 
(-1.84) 
-0.006 
(-1.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
0.002 
(0.48) 
Domestic Merger & 
Acquisition 
-0.016*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.015** 
(-2.55) 
0.212*** 
(2.75) 
0.134** 
(2.54) 
-0.010 
(-0.99) 
-0.006 
(-0.64) 
0.020** 
(2.20) 
0.016** 
(2.08) 
Closed/Exit -0.011 
(-0.88) 
-0.011 
(-0.86) 
0.199*** 
(2.75) 
0.165 
(1.04) 
-0.045*** 
(-3.66) 
-0.022** 
(-2.30) 
0.007 
(0.47) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
Dynamic         
Privatization-
Listing 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
0.010 
(0.16) 
0.014 
(0.22) 
0.008 
(0.53) 
0.008 
(0.64) 
0.005 
(1.00) 
0.006 
(0.94) 
Privatization-
Foreign Acquisition 
.002 
(0.15) 
-0.002 
(-0.10) 
-0.127* 
(-1.72) 
-0.138 
(-1.19) 
-0.024 
(-0.86) 
-0.025 
(-0.90) 
-0.014 
(-1.16) 
-0.018** 
(-2.24) 
Foreign Acquisition -0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.010 
(0.19) 
-0.011 
(-1.55) 
-0.013 
(-1.61) 
-0.014** 
(-2.47) 
-0.014* 
(-1.91) 
Domestic Merger & 
Acquisition 
0.003 
(0.55) 
0.005 
(0.69) 
0.247 
(0.61) 
0.238 
(0.73) 
-0.045** 
(-2.14) 
-0.032** 
(-2.28) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.050** 
(-2.33) 
Time Indicator         
Privatization-
Listing 
.001 
(0.54) 
0.001 
(0.62) 
-.011 
(-0.56) 
-0.012 
(-0.58) 
0.002* 
(1.80) 
0.002 
(0.81) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.87) 
Privatization-
Foreign Acquisition 
-0.000 
(-0.17) 
-0.000 
(-0.30) 
.013 
(1.01) 
0.019 
(1.38) 
0.003*** 
(3.26) 
0.003*** 
(2.90) 
0.001 
(0.72) 
0.002 
(1.30) 
Foreign Acquisition -0.000 
(-0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.53) 
.002 
(0.24) 
0.007 
(0.72) 
0.003** 
(2.47) 
0.006*** 
(3.99) 
0.001 
(1.60) 
0.003** 
(2.01) 
Domestic Merger & 
Acquisition 
0.002 
(1.69) 
0.001 
(0.53) 
-.110 
(-1.15) 
-0.075 
(-0.95) 
0.010** 
(2.21) 
0.009** 
(2.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.30) 
0.006 
(1.53) 
Control Variable         
Lagged Ln Asset 
 
0.001 
(1.27)  
-0.024*** 
(-2.77)  
-0.005*** 
(-3.76)  
-0.006*** 
(-5.11) 
Loan to Deposit 
Ratio  
0.000 
(0.46)  
0.022* 
(1.79)  
-0.000 
(-0.84)  
0.001 
(1.32) 
Non Interest 
Income  
-0.013 
(-0.85)  
0.500* 
(1.71)  
-0.085*** 
(-4.99)  
0.096*** 
(3.03) 
 
        
R2 21.47% 22.03% 21.71% 35.27% 36.25 43.67% 11.86% 24.93% 
Observations 1166 1036 1182 1049 1180 1048 1179 1046 
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5.5.2 Ownership and NIM determinants 
This section provides empirical evidence for our second analysis. Using a panel data 
analysis12, we examine the NIM determinants of banks in Indonesia and evaluate the 
differences among different types of ownership. Table 5.6 shows the movements of NIM 
during 2000-2009 periods, segmented by bank type. The average of NIM of all banks has 
registered an ascending trend during 2000-2004, but it changed during 2005-2009 when the 
average of NIM tended to decrease (except for 2008). The average of NIM for each type of 
ownership showed a similar trend. Regional banks have the highest NIM average of all 
ownership types, followed by domestic bank. These pictures confirm our previous analysis 
that regional have higher NIM than domestic banks, while foreign bank have lower NIM. A 
broad description of variables used in the study is given in table 5.7, which reports their 
descriptive statistics. Table 5.8 shows the correlation matrix of all variables. 
 
 
Table 5.6 
Net Interest Margin in 2000-2009 
 
   
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 All 
Central 
Gov 
Mean 
StDv 
Obs 
2.66% 
2.95% 
6 
4.35% 
2.50% 
6 
4.48% 
2.06% 
6 
5.13% 
2.30% 
6 
6.53% 
2.81% 
6 
6.36% 
2.93% 
6 
5.77% 
2.72% 
6 
5.81% 
2.54% 
6 
5.98% 
2.18% 
6 
5.68% 
1.81% 
6 
5.27% 
2.56% 
60 
         
Regional 
Gov 
 Mean 
StDv 
Obs 
6.83% 
2.23% 
26 
10.32% 
2.68% 
24 
10.43% 
2.23% 
25 
10.06% 
2.86% 
23 
11.25% 
2.99% 
25 
10.66% 
2.77% 
25 
9.66% 
2.43% 
26 
8.62% 
2.48% 
26 
9.73% 
2.25% 
26 
9.13% 
1.99% 
26 
 9.65% 
2.73% 
252 
Private 
Domestic 
Mean 
StDv 
Obs 
3.95% 
1.74 
28 
6.43% 
2.94% 
27 
5.88% 
2.80% 
28 
6.20% 
2.42% 
28 
7.52% 
2.38% 
28 
7.17% 
2.41% 
28 
6.81% 
2.41% 
27 
6.54% 
1.83% 
28 
6.51% 
1.91% 
28 
6.46% 
1.92% 
28 
6.34% 
2.45% 
278 
Foreign 
 
Mean 
StDv 
Obs 
4.57% 
1.56% 
24 
4.39% 
2.33% 
23 
4.47% 
2.47% 
23 
4.10% 
2.35% 
24 
3.94% 
2.14% 
24 
4.81% 
2.55% 
24 
5.62% 
2.61% 
24 
5.28% 
2.61% 
24 
4.96% 
2.19% 
24 
4.51% 
1.84% 
23 
4.67% 
2.30% 
37 
Foreign 
Acqui. 
Mean 
StDv 
Obs 
3.83% 
2.57% 
24 
4.93% 
2.75% 
24 
5.17% 
2.59% 
25 
5.45% 
1.88% 
24 
6.61% 
2.32% 
24 
6.22% 
1.94% 
25 
6.00% 
1.85% 
25 
6.25% 
2.39% 
24 
6.05% 
1.82% 
21 
6.07% 
1.97% 
21 
5.65% 
2.34% 
237 
All 
 
Mean 
StDv 
Obs 
4.50% 
2.57% 
127 
6.11% 
3.62% 
124 
6.12% 
3.37% 
128 
6.23% 
3.30% 
127 
7.30% 
3.61% 
125 
7.12% 
3.31% 
124 
6.76% 
2.93% 
124 
6.52% 
2.65% 
122 
6.70% 
2.75% 
114 
6.47% 
2.59% 
112 
6.37% 
3.18% 
1227 
 
 
                                                          
12
 We will use the Hausman test to choose whether to use, the fixed effect or the random effect panel models.  
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Table 5.7 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
NIM 1228 0.064 0.032 -0.0237 0.1664 
NPL 1240 0.059 0.088 0 0.7159 
Person 1227 0.209 0.091 0.0437 0.4873 
Fixed 1225 0.035 0.029 0.0028 0.1929 
RiskFree 1242 0.184 0.151 0 0.6595 
LDR 1227 0.721 0.345 0.0723 2.6936 
LnAss 1252 14.505 1.859 9.3750 19.7299 
 
 
 
Table 5.8 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 NIM LDR Person Fixed RiskFree NPL LnAss 
NIM 1.0000       
LDR 0.0221 1.0000      
Person 0.5333* -0.0425 1.0000     
Fixed 0.1622* -0.1368* 0.1338* 1.0000    
RiskFree -0.2819* -0.3905* -0.1936* 0.0032 1.0000   
NPL -0.3157* 0.1019* -0.2088* -0.0013 0.0342 1.0000  
LnAss -0.1563* -0.0089 -0.2079* -0.4337* 0.1234* -0.0282 1.0000 
 * Correlation coefficient significantly different from zero at 5% level 
 
Next, we report the results of NIM regression. Table 5.9 shows all the results of the 
regressions. The first column reports estimation results for the baseline specification and for 
the entire sample of Indonesian banks. First, the estimated coefficient for operating costs 
(PersonalExp) is positive and statistically significant, thus an increase in operating costs will 
translate into the increase of margin. This in line with our theoretical prediction and 
confirmed the results obtained in previous research, the operational costs incurred by banks 
are transferred to their clients through the charging of higher margins for financial services.  
The estimated coefficient for credit risk (NPL) is negative and statistically significant. 
Thus the increase of NPL will lead to an increase in margins. This result contradicts the 
findings collected by some previous literature (quote). The negative sign we obtained can be 
explained using the “market discipline argument” (William, 2007; Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 
2008). Following this argument, depositors require a higher premium for depositing their 
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savings in riskier banks (e.g. banks with higher non-performing loan ratio). An increase in 
deposit rates ceteris paribus would contribute to a decline in interest margins, establishing a 
negative relationship between non-performing loans and margins. For instance, Williams 
(2007) observes a negative association between credit risk and interest margins for Australian 
banks. With the exception of the market discipline explanation mentioned above, the negative 
sign could also imply that these banks do a poor job in controlling for credit risk when they 
set their margins. 
We found that the estimated coefficient for liquidity risk (LDR) was significant and 
positive. This result is in line with previous studies that also use the variable of liquidity risk. 
As the liquidity risk increases, banks tend to increase their margins to compensate the 
increase of risk they have to burden. In the case of Indonesian banking, this result also shows 
that loans are still the main sources of banks revenues. Assuming that others factor are 
constant, the more deposits are transformed into loan, the higher the interest margin. 
Further, we analysed NIM determinants model in each sub-sample that we categorized 
based on the type of ownership: central government-controlled banks, regional government-
control banks, domestic private banks, foreign-owned banks (including branch bank) and 
Foreign-acquired. We found that the results in each ownership sub-sample were different 
from the results obtained using the total sample. Columns 2 to 6 report estimation results for 
the baseline specification and for each type of ownership sub-sample. The estimated 
coefficient for personnel expenses is positive and statistically significant. This is also 
consistent across all ownership groups (except for regional banks). As we discussed 
previously, this finding is in line with previous empirical studies which implied that all banks 
respond similarly to the increase of operational costs by transferring these costs on their 
clients through higher margins charged for their financial services.  
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Table 5.9 
Regression results – NIM Determinants 
The table presents the regression results. The t-stats (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. We 
also include year fixed effect but we do not show the results for display’s space reason. *,**,*** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 All Bank Central Gov Reg Gov Domestik for FA 
       
LnAss 0.000 
(0.21) 
0.0026 
(0.85) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.14) 
0.007** 
(2.34) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.006* 
(-1.81) 
LDR 0.011** 
(2.60) 
0.0385* 
(1.79) 
0.040*** 
(4.38) 
0.020** 
(2.24) 
0.005 
(1.53) 
0.006 
(0.67) 
RiskFree -0.008 
(-0.92) 
-0.011 
(-0.73) 
-0.017 
(-1.56) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
0.049*** 
(4.29) 
-0.033* 
(-1.97) 
CreditRisk -0.032** 
(-2.33) 
-0.029 
(-0.83) 
-0.119*** 
(-5.11) 
-0.075** 
(-2.52) 
-0.008 
(-1.05) 
-0.030** 
(-2.32) 
PersonExp  0.054** 
(2.89 
0.2627*** 
(9.31) 
0.023 
(0.74) 
0.181*** 
(4.73) 
0.034* 
(1.71) 
0.090*** 
(3.00) 
FixedAss 0.077 
(0.86 
-0.512** 
(-1.98) 
-0.016 
(-0.19) 
0.133* 
(1.88) 
0.587*** 
(3.16) 
-0.200* 
(-1.75) 
Constanta  0.024 
(0.57 
-0.051 
(-0.84) 
0.168*** 
(3.70) 
-0.090** 
(-2.07) 
0.020 
(0.58) 
0.138** 
(2.48) 
       
Observations 1180 60 251 266 232 234 
R-Sq within 25.00 69.68 46.81 44.87 26.51 46.61 
R-Sq overall 26.61 87.11 54.50 37.26 3.95 11.79 
       
Hausman test       
Prob>chi2 0.000*** 0.9163 0.7300 0.9064 0.9163 0.0000*** 
 Fixed Random Random random Random Fixed 
       
 
The estimated coefficient for Credit risk is negative and consistent across all 
ownership groups. They are all statistically significant except for the central government 
banks and the foreign banks. As we discussed earlier, this finding is in line with the market 
discipline perspective. Following this argument, depositors require a higher premium for 
depositing their savings in riskier banks (William, 2007; Karas, Pyle and Schoors, 2008). The 
result on credit risk could also indicate a more aggressive strategy of regional government, 
domestic private and foreign acquired banks fighting for market shares and thus willing to 
accept higher credit risks without raising their margins.  
As for the case of central government and foreign bank, credit risk did not 
significantly affect their margins. This can be motivated by two explanations. Central 
government banks in Indonesia control the largest shares of the market and they are expected 
to be bailed out by the state when they encounter problems. Thus, depositors in the central 
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government bank are not very sensitive with the level of NPL since they believe that central 
government banks are likely to bankrupt. A similar situation applies for foreign banks. 
Depositors believe that foreign banks are part of big international banks and thus they 
perceive that foreign banks are les likely to collapse. The second reason is because central 
government banks are usually involved in government programs and  state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) lending, so the cost of risk is less likely to translate into increased margins than in the 
case of other banks with different types of ownership. Instead, foreign banks are backed by 
their parents abroad, so they are not really influenced by credit risks. 
The estimated coefficient for liquidity risk (LDR) is positive and consistent across all 
ownership groups. They are all statistically significant except for foreign banks and foreign-
acquired banks. As we stated earlier, the increase of liquidity risk will drive banks to raise 
their margins to compensate the risk escalation. Moreover, the more banks can channel their 
loans, the higher the margins they can obtain, since the spread between loan interests and 
deposit interests is higher than the interest-spread of other bank’s financial assets. On the 
other hand, liquidity risk (LDR) does not significantly affect NIM of foreign banks and 
foreign acquired-banks. Foreign banks might not be aggressive enough in channelling their 
loans. Moreover, they usually focus on non-interest revenues as alternative sources of income. 
Regarding the size of operations, we find that the estimated coefficient for domestic banks is 
positive and significant, indicating that larger domestic banks charge higher margins. On the 
other hand, the impact of the size of operations on NIM is negative for regional banks and 
foreign acquired banks, suggesting that scale economies play a more prominent role in setting 
interest margins than potential losses per unit of operation. In their attempt to expand their 
presence in the market, foreign acquired and regional government banks might be tempted to 
decrease their margins as soon as they start to benefit from economies of scale. 
Finally, the estimated coefficients of FixedAss for private domestic and foreign banks 
are positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that private domestic and 
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foreign banks translate increase on their service coverage into higher margins. On the 
contrary, the estimated coefficients of FixedAss for central government and foreign acquired 
banks are negative and statistically significant. For the central government, the result is in line 
with previous researches. Since the central government banks are involve with government 
programs, usually the increase in government coverage are for social purposes. While for 
foreign acquired banks, the result confirmed previous results that foreign acquired banks are 
more aggressive to expand their presences in market. Thus, they are willing to decrease their 
margin to get more market shares.  
The differences of NIM determinants among different types of ownership in banking 
further indicate that these banks are involved in different types of operations. An interesting 
picture is revealed if we compare NIM determinant among domestic, foreign and foreign-
acquired banks. We can see that foreign acquired banks are different from domestic and also 
from foreign banks. This indicates that changes in ownership might also change a bank’s 
business orientation and strategies. However, changes are always gradual and require a long 
time to unfold. Based on these findings, we establish the proposition that the impact of 
ownership or governance changes is influenced by the ways in which changes in business 
orientation and strategies take place.    
Overall, our results suggest that there are substantial differences in the role played by 
bank interest margin determinants across ownership groups. Results for the total sample 
presented in the previous section are driven by the combination of all sub-samples, since each 
sub-sample has a similar number of observations, except for the Central Government bank. 
However, central government banks still hold a substantial part of the banking sector assets. 
Therefore, disregarding the ownership structure as a factor of analysis might lead to erroneous 
conclusions about the impact of interest margin determinants in Indonesia.   
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5.6 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate how banks’ performance is affected by different 
types of ownership and changes in it. Furthermore, we also analyse how different types of 
ownership have different business orientations. We argue that this knowledge is important in 
explaining the relationship between ownership and performance. The empirical sections of the 
paper make use of an unbalanced panel data set of 133 banks in Indonesian banking industry, 
with annual observations from 2000 to 2009. After the Asian Crisis 1997, the Indonesian 
banking sector underwent some huge transformations. As the results, the current ownership 
structure of the Indonesia’s banking industry allows us to see various forms of banking 
ownership, starting from government-controlled banks, domestic private banks mostly 
controlled by families, join-venture banks, and branch banks. These various forms of 
ownership have provided a context fitted with our research purposes. 
In the first analysis, given the varied nature of ownership changes during the sample 
period, we extended the model of Berger et al. (2005) that controls for static, selection, and 
dynamic effects. We found that regional banks, foreign banks and branch banks have a higher 
profitability than domestic private banks. While foreign and branch banks’ profitability is 
mostly influenced by their efficiency, on the other hand, regional banks profitability is 
propelled by their interest margins. We also find that government banks that underwent 
privatization and domestic banks that underwent M&As have higher overhead-cost levels or 
lower efficiency. Instead, banks that were closed during period of 2000-2009 have lower 
interest margins. In the short run, foreign acquisitions and domestic M&As can reduce the 
level of overhead costs but this effect vanishes in the long run, when foreign acquisition and 
M&A can increase the Net Interest Margin. 
Now, we will try to compare our results with the ones collected by previous empirical 
research. First of all, regarding the static effects, we found that foreign banks (including the 
branch banks) were more profitable (higher ROA) and more efficient than domestic banks. 
  
108 
These findings are consistent with the empirical literature (Bonin et al., 2005; Claessens et al., 
2001; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999). In developing countries, foreign banks are more 
profitable and efficient than their domestic counterparts; as a matter of fact, they are more 
likely to pursue profit-maximizing opportunities than government or domestic blockholder-
controlled banks, which may be deterred by the presence of ulterior motives such as social 
motives or business group motives (Claessens, et al., 2001; Micco, et al., 2007). Foreign 
banks will thus be more likely to direct their investments to those firms or industries with 
better prospects for profit.  
Interestingly, we find that regional banks have a better profitability in terms of ROA 
and NIM than domestic banks. We argue that this happens because regional banks have an 
access to regional government budget. Although there are no specific regulations that obligate 
each regional government to deposit money in its own regional bank, in practice, this is a 
situation that usually verifies. Actually, most transactions imply the territorial bank: for 
example, the payroll for public servants is usually managed by regional government banks. 
This privilege has given regional banks more access to “cheap” funding. Moreover, regional 
banks have a monopoly power since they only focus to operate in one province. They have 
operations in rural areas of the province where the availability of loan services by banks is 
quite limited. This monopoly power is usually transferred into higher interest margin 
(Saunders and Schumacher, 2000). Due to this particular condition, regional government 
banks can charge higher interests as a compensation for the costs that they sustain in 
providing such services. Besides the fact that regional government banks have more 
profitability, we also found that they have lower operating efficiency. We argue that, similarly 
to central government banks, regional banks are also vulnerable to political interventions even 
though not as pervasively as in central government banks.  
With respect to the selection effects, results suggest that, in terms of operating 
efficiency, banks involved in privatization processes underperform domestic banks that do not 
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undergo ownership changes. This result is congruent with those of previous empirical 
research. For example, Berger et al. (2005) find that Argentine banks that were privatized 
recorded poor performance prior to privatization. The underperformance of banks associated 
with government ownership is also consistent with previous empirical findings. Most of the 
existing empirical findings support the arguments that government banks have lower 
performance (lower profitability and/or lower efficiency) because they have other goals 
besides profitability, because they are susceptible to frequent political interventions and they 
often have a poor management (Sapienza, 2004; Clarke et al., 2005; Classens and Peters, 
1997; Djankov, 1999; Shirley and Nellis, 1991; World Bank, 1995). Moreover, we could not 
find evidence that foreign investors tend to target profitable banks, although we could not find 
confirmations that foreign bank target not profitable banks either. 
Regarding the effects of governance changes (dynamic-dummy variables), the 
estimated coefficient of foreign acquisition (both privatization and general foreign 
acquisition) and domestic M&A is negative and statistically significant in the OH regression. 
This result means that, in the short-run, foreign acquisition and M&A activities can reduce the 
level of overhead costs. This result is in line with some previous studies (Berger et al., 2005, 
Lin and Zhang, 2009). As it happens for non-bank firms, governance or ownership changes in 
banks are usually followed by economization measures including organization restructuring 
and employee rationalization. The new owners and management usually start reviewing the 
scope of bank activities; they focus on profit-generating activities and lay off the activities 
with lower profitability. 
In the second analysis, we provide the first evidence on the determinants of bank-
interests’ margins in Indonesia with a particular emphasis on a bank’s characteristics and the 
role of bank ownership. Unlike previous studies, which evaluate the impact of bank 
ownership by introducing dummy variables, we estimate separate regressions for banks with 
different ownership structures. This technique allowed us to see how the impact of interest 
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margin determinants varies across different ownership structures. Our findings lend support to 
the hypothesis that bank ownership moderates the impact of the theoretically motivated 
determinants of the bank’s interest margin. Our results are in line with previous researches by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Martinez-Peria and Mody, 2004, that found 
ownership has an impact on NIM determinants. 
Results for the total sample presented in the previous section are driven by the 
combination of all sub-samples, since each sub-sample has a similar number of observations, 
except for the central government bank. However, central government-controlled banks still 
holds a substantial part of the banking sector assets. Overall, our results suggest that there are 
substantial differences in the role played by banks’ interest margin determinants across 
ownership groups. Therefore, disregarding the ownership structure as a factor of analysis 
might lead to erroneous conclusions about the impact of interest margin determinants in 
Indonesia.  The obtained results emphasize the importance of taking into account bank 
ownership structure and call for a reassessment of previous empirical findings on interest 
margin determinants, especially of those panel data studies that include countries with 
significant variations in the banking ownership structure. Moreover, the results also provide 
new evidence about the impact of ownership changes on performance, especially with regards 
to the banking industry. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Conclusions and Further Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
Our studies ere developed in order to understand the emergence of new types of ownership 
structure and provide, with respect to the status quo of the reference literature, further 
information on the relationship between such ownership types and performance particularly in 
the effort to capture what happens within firms that experience ownership changes. For doing 
that, we are using data from the Indonesian banking sector in 2000-2009 to provide an 
empirical analysis that we have articulated in two different studies.  
In the first study we have analysed the effects of the presence of multiple blockholders 
on bank performance by focusing on the distribution of ownership, in particularly on the 
distribution of shares across different ownership’s identities among blockholders. We find 
that the number of blockholders have negative impacts both on bank profitability and 
efficiency. On the contrary, blockholders concentration has positive impacts both on bank 
profitability and efficiency. Moreover, we observe that the ownership dispersion across 
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different types of blockholders has negative effects on both bank’s profitability and 
efficiency. Our results are robust to different specifications and additional tests, in particular 
to those conducted to take into account the endogenous nature of ownership structure. 
We extended studies on multiple blockholders by looking at the heterogeneity of 
blockholders.  We argue that the way shares are distributed across large owners with different 
identities plays a significant role in determining the impact of governance arrangements on 
performance. We claim that looking only at the concentration or dispersion of shares, without 
considering also the identity of shareholders provides, only a partial perspective to study 
principal-agent or principal-principal problems. Second, we suggest that - given the increase 
of complexity and dynamism in ownership structures around the world, and in particular in 
emerging countries - traditional agency theory may be not sufficient to fully understand how 
internal governance systems affect firms’ strategies and results. The recourse to multiple 
agency and principal-principal perspectives (Arthurs and Johnson, 2008; Connelly et al., 
2010; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Young et al., 2008) can provide a deeper insight to explain what 
happens in multiple blockholders firms. Third, this study shows the importance of considering 
ownership composition among blockholders in banking studies. While the topic of corporate 
governance structures has been widely investigated in banking studies (Berger et al., 2005; 
Bonin et al., 2005; Caprio et al., 2007; Shehzad et al., 2010), most of the works have focused 
only on dominant or major shareholders, without taking into account ownership composition 
and the joint presence of blockholders with multiple identities. 
Our second study aimed to evaluate how bank performance has been affected by types 
of ownership and by changes in types of ownership. Furthermore, we have also analysed how 
different types of ownership bring about different business orientations. We argue that this 
kind of information is important in explaining the relationship between ownership and 
performance. By extending the model of Berger et al. (2005) that controlled for static, 
selection, and dynamic effects of ownership types on performance, our work shades light on 
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types of ownership that have been ignored in previous studies but which are common in 
emerging countries, such as regional banks or branch banks. After controlling for bank 
characteristics and time, we observed that ownership types (owner’s identities) do have an 
impact on performance. In addition to that, ownership changes have impacts on performance 
both in the short and in the long-run. Furthermore, we provided evidence on how the 
determinants of the banks’ interest margins, reflecting banks’ business orientation, vary 
across different ownership types. Moreover, we also found that changes in ownership lead to 
changes in bank business orientation.  
Our second study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it shades 
some more light on what happens to banks that undertake ownership or governance changes. 
Many of previous studies tend to view governance changes only as a transfer from one type of 
ownership to another and they attribute differences in performance, prior- and post-ownership 
change, only to the management ability associated with each type of ownership ( e.g. 
Williams & Nguyen, 2005). Our analysis provides strong support for the notion that changes 
in ownership might shift a bank’s business orientation and this, in turn, have an impact on a 
bank’s performance. On this basis, information about the ways in which banks conduct their 
business after governance or ownership changes is crucial to gain a better understanding of 
the impacts of ownership changes on performance. Second, it extends the study on NIM 
determinants (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga, 2000; Carbo-Valverde & Rodriguez-Fernandez, 
2007; Williams, 2007) by analysing how NIM determinants differ depending on the bank’s 
ownership-type and on the existence of governance changes. The concept that determinants of 
banks’ interest margins might differ by banks’ ownership-type has not been properly explored 
in the literature so far. We suggest that the sources of interest-income and expenditures differ 
by banks’ ownership. Thus, different banks’ owners have different incentives, and 
consequently different strategies, when setting margins. Third, our study provides a broader 
picture about the impacts of different types of banks ownership on performance. Only a few 
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studies (Berger et. al., 2005, Bonin et al, 2005, Williams and Nguyen, 2005) document the 
more nuanced, holistic view of state, foreign, and domestic ownership of banks. However, 
those studies did not capture some types of ownership which are common in emerging 
countries, such as regional banks and branch banks.  
 
6.2 Limitations and future research avenues 
We acknowledge that the present studies have some limitations. The first group of limitations 
is related with both of the empirical analysis in this dissertation. First of all, we recognize that 
focusing on a single industry (banking industry) can reduce the generalization potential of our 
findings. One of the conditions that might influence our findings is the fact that the banking 
industry is a strongly regulated and highly monitored industry. These conditions could 
influence the relationship between ownership and performance. For example, highly regulated 
conditions have left little possibility of expropriation by controlling shareholders (Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005).  This, in turn, might determine that the benefits induced by additional control 
of blockholders in banking sector are lower than the conflicts raised by additional 
blockholders.  
The second limitation is related our single country analysis. Similarly with previous 
limitation, analysing a single country can make our results not transferable to other 
institutional environments. However, using a single-country approach enabled us to study the 
whole population of banks active over a long period of time, thus providing a unique context 
to test our hypotheses. Among the specificities of the Indonesian context which might affect 
our findings, we can mention the level of transparency and the legal protection for minority 
shareholders in the country. For example, the level of transparency has a significant effect on 
the relationship between ownership structure and performance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002b; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). Indonesia, as other emerging 
countries, has a low legal protection of minority shareholders. This makes the agency costs of 
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disperse ownership larger than concentrated ownership. This might also be the reason why 
concentrated ownership is more appropriate for Indonesia since it will be able to reduce 
agency costs. Our results are also in line with other previous researches in emerging countries 
which found that concentrated ownership has a positive impact on firm performance or firm 
value in emerging markets. In addition to that, as pointed out by numerous studies (Peng, 
2004; Peng, Buck, & Filatotchev, 2003; Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Chan, 2001), in 
emerging economies internal governance arrangements based on dominant owners are 
focused on ownership, because of the weak external legal infrastructures that often do not 
adequately protect investors. Without trying to devaluate the presence of agency conflicts, we 
argue that conflicts among owners are more relevant in this context. As highlighted by 
principal-principal theories (Young et al., 2008), in emerging economies the tendency of 
conflicts between principal-principal are relatively high. As a consequence of the conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders, ownership concentration and sharing control 
within the firm becomes a crucial dimension to analyse (Lopez-de-Foronda, López-Iturriaga, 
& Santamaría-Mariscal, 2007).  
Comparisons of the relation between control contestability and firm performance in 
countries with different degrees of investor protection seem an interesting topic for further 
research. Further evidence is thus needed to replicate our results in other sectors and different 
institutional contexts. We do believe, however, that the results of our work shed a new light 
on the importance of more carefully considering the heterogeneity of blockholders in the 
studies on ownership structure and firm performance.  Our work also provides new evidence 
about the impact of ownership changes on business orientation and performance.  It is 
paramount to take into consideration variations in business orientations brought about by 
ownership rearrangements, since in turn, these will play a key role in determining 
performance.  
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The second group of limitations is related with each of empirical study. Regarding 
with the specific limitation of first study, it is still not clear by which mechanism the presence 
of multiple shareholders with different identities impact on performance. Our result only 
reveal that the increase in shares distribution among different type of blockholders have 
negative impact and our assumption is this happen because the increase in conflict between 
blockholders. However, how this conflict translates into decrease in performance is still not 
known. For instance, does it impact related on the size and composition of the board 
directors? In order to increase our understanding of the precise mechanisms through which a 
governance structure with multiple large shareholders affect firm performance, more 
theoretical research in this area is needed. 
The second limitation of our first empirical study is that we referred the impact of only 
on financial performance. It is interesting to expand the impact also on others type of 
performances such as bank’s value and bank’s risk. Moreover, we know that each of 
ownership identity have different king of goals beside profit or financial performance. For 
instance government bank have social and development goal or family bank might have 
motivation to help affiliated company. Using several performance indicator would be help to 
understand more about how the interaction of between ownership identity and its particular 
motives. 
Concerning with the limitation of the second empirical study, we are using NIM 
determinants as an indicators of bank’s business orientation. Although NIM determinants 
might reflect the factor that influenced banks in setting their service prices, but they might not 
directly reflect bank’s business orientation. The next research should be more focus on 
variables that directly reflect the bank’s business indicators, although the limitation of data 
availability might be obstacles to construct those variables. Secondly, our study provides 
evidence that changes in ownership influence banks’ business orientations and we argue this 
will have impacts on performance. However, we are not providing evidence how far the 
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changes in business orientation as a result of changes in ownership will have impact on 
performance. 
 
6.3 Policy implications 
As a matter of policy implications of the results of our studies, we can draw several proposal 
at managerial and industry/country level. Our first study is intended to create greater 
awareness of principal-principal conflicts that usually happen in emerging country and to 
reiterate the point that corporate governance in emerging economies does not closely 
resemble the stylized agency theory model centred on principal-agency conflicts. The results 
confirm the limitations of research that focuses predominantly on widely held firms or on 
firms with a single large shareholder. We found that the performance of banks with high 
blockholder concentration differs from that of other banks). Moreover, the evidence presented 
in first study expands our understanding of the link between ownership structure and 
performance. Our results showing that the presence of other blockholders or the presence of 
multiple blockholders not necessary give positive contribution to performance by providing 
the contestability to the leading shareholder’s and minimising the expropriation of minority 
shareholders. In fact, multiple blockholders can bring negative consequence on performance.  
The managerial implication that can be drawn for the results of our first study is the 
importance of corporate governance system that can exploit the additional monitor from the 
presence of multiple blockholders and in the same time also can minimise the potential 
conflict that might happen. There several ways to achieve such corporate governance system 
that provide suggested by previous study. First is what is called as German and Japanese 
corporate governance systems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). These systems are often credited 
with reducing agency problems while avoiding the most egregious PP conflicts associated 
with concentrated ownership. This is often achieved through a strong network of owners, 
creditors, employees, and government. Another potentially promising avenue for examining 
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how to address PP conflicts is the idea of controlling coalitions (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000). With controlling coalitions, ownership and control are distributed among several large 
owners and no individual shareholder is large enough to control the firm. This makes it much 
harder, for example, to divert funds from the corporation as such an action would require 
interaction (or collusion) among major coalitions. Advocates of coalitions maintain that 
controlling shareholders have incentive to set up such an arrangement as this creates a 
credible commitment (a form of bonding) that they will not undertake unilateral action to 
expropriate funds. However, we still need some researches to analyse on whether the 
German–Japanese model and controlling coalition model are fit and realistic for corporate 
governance reforms in emerging economies. 
Our first study result could also be useful for regulators or government. Although our 
result refer that ownership concentration bring positive impact for financial performance, but 
it is not necessary that concentrated ownership is the optimal arrangement for the welfare of 
the society. Concentrated ownership increases the likelihood of the expropriation by 
controlling owner that will result in the unfair treatment of minority shareholders. Moreover, 
controlling owner might not promote strategies that are in the best interests of organizational 
performance and this could bring negative externalities to society. This is particularly 
unfortunate given the impoverished populations among which many of these firms operate. In 
the case of banking sector, the cost could be very high. As what happen in Indonesia when 
1997-1998 Asian crisis interrupted, the miss management of banks make bank sector very 
vulnerable to economic shock and the government need to spend huge amount of money to 
restructuring the banking sector. 
Thus, it is important for regulators to minimise the opportunity of expropriation by 
controlling shareholders. Specific to Indonesian banking industry, bank central needs to 
prevent misbehaviour by controlling owners that could be harmful. For example impose more 
strict regulation in connected lending activities. Related with the legal framework of 
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ownership, the government needs to increase the regulation in shareholder protection. The 
stronger shareholder protection will increase the effectiveness of additional control by other 
blockholders (La porta, et al., 1999). Moreover, our data analysis shows that most of the 
banks are have concentrated ownership that can be seen as the result of low ownership 
protection. From this we also suggest that bank’s regulation is not the substitution of legal 
framework on shareholder protection. In summary, resolving PP conflicts in emerging 
economies requires creative solutions beyond the standard approaches. Individual countries 
will likely need to work out solutions to their own particular institutional conditions (Young 
et al., 2008). As such, resolving PP conflicts in emerging economies could improve the living 
standards for potentially millions of people (Morck et al., 2005). 
Our second study tries to bring some explanation about relationship of ownership type 
and performance. From managerial point of view, our result highlight that changes in 
ownership might also changes bank business orientation. Since different type of ownership 
have different objectives and preference, the management must be ready to changes their 
strategies when there is a change in ownership. The issue is how to make the transformation 
going smoothly. Although we also find that it will take consider a time for bank’s that 
experience changes in ownership to become more profitable.  
Regarding with the government ownership in banking, our results provide some 
support for ongoing bank ownership reform. We find the government ownership is negatively 
related to bank performance especially with efficiency. Although we find that regional banks 
on average are relatively more profitable than private domestic bank however we also find 
that regional banks have lower operating efficiency.  Off course it would be not fair using 
financial performance as a bench mark to evaluate the importance of government ownership 
on bank. Since government bank have different role. However our results highlight the 
efficiency is the problem. 
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We do not come to such a clear conclusion concerning foreign acquisition. Foreign 
banks were not appeared to cherry-pick their acquisitions. Whilst banks taken over by foreign 
institutions have improved their efficiency, however the impact seems only in the short run. 
Since our result can not find the long term effect of foreign acquisition on efficiency. 
Moreover, we found that in the long run foreign acquisition seem increases the NIM. 
Although this could be positive news since it means that the profitability increases, but this 
also could mean that the price for lending is increase. The implications for policy that can be 
drawn from the results of this study is that liberalization policy not sufficient to increase the 
efficiency of the banking Industry, especially in the long term. It is also important to 
understand more understand about financial liberalization. Financial liberalization is intended 
to make banking sector more open but it does not mean a banking sector with free of 
regulations. In fact a more open banking sector should accompanied by appropriate 
regulations to ensure an efficient and healthy banking sector, contributing to the development 
of the economy and welfare of the society.  
Secondly due to the complexity of bank business nowadays, any policy analysis 
should rely upon different indicators and mainly upon those that reflect the whole reality of 
the bank output mix and explicitly consider. Moreover, banking regulators need to very 
careful in imposing some regulations that intended to changes banks behaviour. Since we find 
that different bank have different characteristics, for instance the level of risk tolerance. Thus 
the implication of some policies might be different through different type of banks. Finally, 
the regulators need to be more focus on efficiency level of banks. Since any cost that 
burdened by banks will be transferred to consumer in term of the higher price of financial 
service. For example, higher interest rate for loan. Thus, the high efficiency level of banks 
will maintain the intermediaries function of banks. 
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